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THREE ESSAYS ON POLICY EVALUATION IN DEVELOPING
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(Order No. )
MICHAEL DAVID GECHTER
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015
Major Professor: Dilip Mookherjee, Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a collection of three independent essays on the theory and appli-
cation of methods of policy analysis in development economics. The first chapter tackles
the methodological problem of external validity: the extent to which a study’s findings
apply to settings outside of the study’s original context. There has recently been much
debate within development economics over the practical usefulness of randomized policy
evaluations outside of the places and times they were originally implemented. The chapter
offers a practical solution to the problem of assessing generalizability: I derive bounds on
the average causal effect in a context of interest using data from a previous experimental
study.
The second chapter, coauthored with Amrit Amirapu, investigates the costs that labor
regulations impose on Indian firms. Regulatory burden has been viewed as the cause of
many economic problems in India, including misallocation of resources across firms and
slow growth. Many Indian regulations do not apply to firms with fewer than 10 workers.
We use a downward discontinuity in the size distribution of firms at the 10-worker threshold
to quantify regulatory costs imposed on firms. We find that these costs are substantial on
average but vary widely across states, with firms in more corrupt states facing higher implied
costs.
The third chapter, also coauthored with Amrit Amirapu, investigates changes in the
production of certain goods in India in response to the elimination of the Small Scale
vii
Industry Reservation policy. This policy mandated that only firms maintaining less than a
particular level of capital stock (about $1 million) were eligible to produce specific goods.
The policy was gradually phased out over the period from 1997 to 2008. Different goods
were de-reserved in different years, facilitating the comparison of markets for recently de-
reserved goods relative to never-reserved and still-reserved goods. We investigate the effects
of de-reservation on small incumbent firms owing to competition from large formal entrants.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Generalizing the Results from Social Experiments: Theory and Evidence
from Mexico and India
1.1 Introduction
What do causal effects measured in one place tell us about causal effects in another place
or at another time? It is clear that not every finding applies in every context. Some au-
thors have recently protested against policy recommendations they see as based on implicit
extrapolation from a small number of experiments to a wide variety of dissimilar contexts
(Deaton (2010); Pritchett and Sandefur (2013)). Empirically, a growing body of work finds
different effects of identical policies among individuals with the same observed characteris-
tics living in different contexts (e.g. Allcott (2015); Attanasio, Meghir, and Szekely (2003)).
Unobserved differences between populations remain, even when considering individuals with
the same observed characteristics.
In this paper, causal effects from one place may be only partially informative about
effects elsewhere. I derive bounds on the average causal effect in a context of interest using
experimental evidence from another context. I use differences in outcome distributions for
individuals with the same characteristics and treatment status in the original study and
the context of interest to learn about unobserved differences across contexts1. Greater dif-
ferences in outcome distributions generate wider bounds. The bounds represent a practical
solution to the problem of assessing generalizability of experimental results from one con-
text to another and are easily computed using software provided by the author for any pair
of contexts. They formalize the idea that the conclusions we can draw about the average
causal effect in the context of interest and the strength of assumptions required to do so
1When we do not have experiments with context-level characteristics we believe are sufficiently similar to
the context of interest, unobserved differences necessarily include differences in context-level characteristics.
2depends on the similarity between the two contexts2.
I consider settings where we have run a randomized evaluation of a pilot program and
wish to know what we can conclude about the effect of the program in another context.
The experimental treatment group has access to the program, while the control group does
not. As part of the evaluation, we collected data on characteristics and outcomes of indi-
viduals participating in the experiment. We also have data on outcomes and characteristics
of individuals in the alternative context, possibly coming from a separate survey. Since
the program is a pilot, individuals in the alternative context do not have access to the
program3. For each distinct set of characteristics, we thus have the distributions of treated
and untreated outcomes from the experiment and the distribution of untreated outcomes
from the alternative context.
The bounds I derive on the average causal effect in the context of interest for each set
of characteristics are based on the assumption that the distribution of treated outcomes
for a given untreated outcome in the context of interest is consistent with the experimental
results. This is a weak restriction on the average causal effect because the experiment does
not rule out any level of dependence between treated and untreated outcomes4. Except
in extreme cases, we expect positive dependence between treated and untreated outcomes,
to varying degrees depending on the nature of the program. Most programs cannot cause
those well-off without the program to switch places with those poorly-off in absolute terms.
I therefore develop tighter bounds, indexed by the minimum level of dependence be-
tween an individual’s treated and untreated outcomes we are willing to consider. When
treated and untreated outcomes are perfectly dependent, differences in untreated outcome
2See Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, and Yavitz (2010) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) who assess
the external validity of experimental results on the basis of the similarity of the experimental populations
to larger populations of interest.
3The analysis can easily be extended to the case when individuals choose their treatment status and an
experiment denies treatment to a random subset of individuals who would wish to be treated (see Bitler,
Domina, and Hoynes (2014) for an example of such an experiment).
4The literature on distributions of causal effects consistent with experimental results generates similarly
wide bounds on functionals of interest (Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); Djebbari and Smith (2008);
Fan and Park (2010); Kim (2014)).
3distributions are not a problem because each untreated outcome is linked to a single treated
outcome. As we move away from perfect dependence, different associations between treated
and untreated outcomes become possible. These different associations produce uncertainty
about the average causal effect in the new context that is increasing in the difference be-
tween the distributions of untreated outcomes in the experiment and the context of interest.
The width of the bounds for a given minimum dependence level provide a measure of un-
certainty about the average causal effect. They also allow us to assess the assumptions on
dependence between treated and untreated outcomes necessary to draw specific conclusions
about the effect of the program in the context of interest, such as its ability to exceed a
cost-effectiveness threshold.
I empirically evaluate the results of my bounding procedure compared to existing meth-
ods for extrapolating causal effects to new contexts. The current benchmark method (Hotz,
Imbens, and Mortimer (2005), henceforth HIM) also uses outcome distributions for indi-
viduals with the same characteristics to assess generalizability, but does so within a testing
framework. If we reject that the untreated outcome distributions for individuals with the
same characteristics are the same, we conclude that the experiment teaches us nothing
about causal effects in the context of interest. Otherwise, the HIM framework concludes
the experiment is perfectly predictive for the causal effect of interest.
I first examine the generalizability of a small experiment on the returns to loosening
credit constraints by providing cash transfers to very small-scale entrepreneurs in Leon,
Mexico in 2006 documented in McKenzie and Woodruff (2008). We would like to know
what the large estimated returns (an increase in monthly profits equal to roughly 40% of
the transfer in baseline specifications) in Leon in 2006 tell us about the average return
for similarly small-scale microentrepreneurs in urban Mexico in 2012, as represented by
that year’s national microenterprise survey. The distributions of untreated outcomes are
fairly similar in the Leon and 2012 urban Mexico samples so the estimated bounds are
narrow for a wide range of assumptions on dependence between profits with and without the
4transfer. Properly accounting for the unobserved differences between the populations along
with sampling variation in the small experimental sample and the national microenterprise
sample leads to wide confidence intervals around the bounds. Testing equality of control
outcome distributions, in contrast, would lead us to be overconfident in our prediction of the
average return. Perversely, using the HIM method, we would compute a narrower confidence
interval on the predicted causal effect for urban Mexico in 2012 than on the causal effect in
the original experiment.
Second, to check the predictions of different methods against measured causal effects,
I use data from randomized evaluations of a remedial education program implemented in
two Indian cities and described in Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and Linden (2007). I find different
average causal effects for individuals with the same observed characteristics in the two cities.
The two cities’ student populations are sufficiently different that equality of their untreated
outcome distributions is rejected, which, in the HIM framework would lead us to believe
we cannot learn anything about the causal effect in one city based on experimental results
from the other. However, I show that if we assume treated and untreated outcomes are
sufficiently dependent, we can exclude a substantial range of average causal effects - such
as a zero effect - in one city using the results from the other. The observed causal effects in
both cities are consistent with predictions based on strong dependence between the treated
and untreated outcomes.
This paper extends the literature on generalizing causal effects to new contexts based on
invariance assumptions on average treated outcomes or causal effects for individuals with
the same observed characteristics (HIM, Attanasio et al. (2003); Angrist and Ferna´ndez-Val
(2013); Angrist and Rokkanen (2013); Cole and Stuart (2010); Stuart, Cole, Bradshaw,
and Leaf (2011); Pearl and Bareinboim (2014); Flores and Mitnik (2013)). In interpreting
differences in untreated outcome distributions as indicative of unobserved differences in
populations, I follow a long line of literature interpreting outcome quantiles as representing
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity in non-separable models (see, for example, Matzkin
5(2007) and the references therein). Most directly, Athey and Imbens (2006) make use of this
interpretation when generalizing the standard difference-in-differences estimator and derive
an estimator that is equivalent to mine under perfect dependence between the treated
and untreated outcomes. In moving from a testing framework to an approach based on
quantifying assumptions required to draw conclusions about causal effects, my paper relates
to work by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and Altonji, Conley, Elder, and Taber (2013).
Altonji et al. (2005) and Altonji et al. (2013) move from testing whether observed covariates
related to an outcome are also related to a candidate instrument to providing bounds on the
average causal effect whose width depends on the magnitude of the relationship between
the covariates and the instrument.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the intuition behind
the proposed methods by means of a simple example. Readers uninterested in the technical
details behind the methods in their full generality may wish to read section 1.2 then skip to
the empirical results in sections 1.5 and 1.6. Beginning the theoretical discussion, section
1.3 sets up the problem and notation and provides a review of existing approaches to
extrapolation on the basis of experimental results. In section 1.4, I present the derivation of
the bounds. Section 1.5 presents the empirical results for generalizing from the 2006 Leon
microenterprise experiment to urban locations in Mexico in 2012. Section 1.6 investigates
using the results from one of the two remedial education experiments to try to predict the
results in the other experiment. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Intuition for the methodology: a simple example
To illustrate the intuition behind the methodological contributions, I begin by laying out a
simple example involving a fictional conditional cash transfer program (CCT) that incen-
tivizes parents to enroll children in school. Suppose we have obtained experimental results
that tell us the CCT program caused a large increase in the enrollment rate in location e,
from 13 of all children to
2
3 of all children. We observe only outcomes and no characteristics.
6We would like to know what the results from location e tell us about the causal effect
we can expect in location a, where no CCT was implemented. Whereas 13 of children were
enrolled without the CCT program in location e, 12 of children are enrolled without the CCT
in location a. We would like to know what impact the difference in the no-CCT enrollment
rates will have on the average causal effect in location a. The law of total probability allows
us to decompose the average effect of the CCT program in a, denoted ATEa, as follows.
ATEa =P (enrolled with CCT | enrolled without CCT)×P (enrolled without CCT)
+ P (enrolled with CCT | out of school without CCT)×P (out of school without CCT)
− P (enrolled without CCT)
=P (enrolled with CCT | enrolled without CCT)× 1
2
+ P (enrolled with CCT | out of school without CCT)× 1
2
− 1
2
The average causal effect in a depends on two unknown probabilities: (1) the probability
that an individual who does not enroll without the CCT would instead enroll with the
CCT and (2) the probability that an individual who enrolls in school without the CCT
would also enroll with the CCT.
The rationale behind (1), individuals who do not enroll without the CCT enrolling with
a CCT, is clear: the program provides cash incentives for parents to enroll children in
school and some parents respond to these incentives. The rationale behind (2), individuals
who enroll without the CCT but would not enroll with the CCT, is less straightforward.
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012) show that CCT programs can increase wages for
children by lowering the supply of child labor. An increased wage for children works against
the enrollment incentives. Further, Attanasio et al. (2012) show that enrollment subsidies
and child wages do not have equal opposite effects on households’ enrollment decisions,
as they would if only the net child wage entered into the enrollment decision. So we can
think of some fraction of households who are more sensitive to child wages than they are to
7enrollment subsidies and would respond to a CCT by having children work. To maintain
the simplicity of this example, I will refer to forces that cause children who would enroll
without the CCT but would not enroll with a CCT in place as wage effects, although in
principle there may be other ways for the CCT to cause children who would otherwise enroll
to not enroll.
Figure 1.1: Permissible distributions for P (enrolled with CCT | enrollment without CCT)
in location a
I will assume that P (enrolled with CCT | enrolled without CCT) in location a is consis-
tent with the experimental results. There are many possible pairs of conditional enrollment
probabilities that are consistent with the experimental results. The possible pairs are given
in Figure 1.1. To see why a continuum of pairs is possible, recall that
P (enrolled with CCT | enrolled without CCT)
=
P (enrolled with CCT & enrolled without CCT)
P (enrolled without CCT)
.
8We see that P (enrolled with CCT | enrolled without CCT) relies on knowledge a child’s
enrollment status with and without the CCT at the same time, knowledge that we cannot
have. If a child is in one of the treated localities, we only observe her enrollment decision with
the CCT. If she is in one of the control localities, we only observe her enrollment decision
without the CCT. The question marks in table 1.1 indicate the unknown fractions of the
population of location e falling into each of the four possible combinations of enrollment
decisions with and without the CCT. The sums across rows and down columns show the
information we do have from the experiment. The rows of table 1.1 must sum to the control
group results and the columns to the treatment group results.
Table 1.1: The distribution of enrollment with and without the CCT is unknown in location
e
CCT
Out of school Enrolled All Control
No CCT
Out of school ? ? 23
Enrolled ? ? 13
All Treatment 13
2
3
Our assumptions about the way the wage effects of the CCT impact the two groups of
children (those enrolling without the CCT and those who do not enroll without the CCT)
will generate different predictions for the causal effect of the CCT program in location a. To
see this, first consider the case where there are no wage effects or wage effects only impact
children who do not enroll without the CCT. Then there are no children who enroll without
the CCT but would not enroll when the CCT is in place. Our assumption allows us to fill in
all the entries of table 1.1, as shown in table 1.2. The probability of enrolling with the CCT
if a child is out of school without the CCT is 12 and the increase in the fraction enrolled in
location a is 14 .
Now consider another assumption about the wage effects: they only impact those who
enroll without the CCT and they are so strong that all children who would enroll without
the CCT drop out. To match the distribution of control and treated group outcomes in
location e, all children who are out of school without the CCT must enroll with the CCT.
9Table 1.2: Case 1: there are no wage effects
CCT
Out of school Enrolled All Control
No CCT
Out of school 13
1
3
2
3
Enrolled 0 13
1
3
All Treatment 13
2
3
Again, we can fill in the unknown entries of table 1.1, as shown in table 1.3. In this rather
unbelievable case, we predict no change in the fraction enrolled in location a.
Table 1.3: Case 2: wage effects only impact those who enroll without the CCT
CCT
Out of school Enrolled All Control
No CCT
Out of school 0 23
2
3
Enrolled 13 0
1
3
All Treatment 13
2
3
Assuming that wage effects impact the same fraction of both groups is somewhat more
believable. To be consistent with the experimental results, this fraction must be 13 . The
entries of table 1.1 can be filled in as shown in table 1.4. The predicted increase in the
fraction employed is 16 .
Table 1.4: Case 3: wage effects impact the same fraction of both groups
CCT
Out of school Enrolled All Control
No CCT
Out of school 29
4
9
2
3
Enrolled 19
2
9
1
3
All Treatment 13
2
3
While more believable than assuming that those enrolled with and without the CCT
exchange places when the CCT is in place, assuming that wage effects have the same impact
on both groups is still not very convincing. Intuitively, we believe that wage effects would
have a stronger impact on enrollment decisions for children who do not enroll without the
CCT. Formally, we expect positive dependence between enrollment with the CCT and en-
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rollment without. In this paper, I measure dependence using the rank correlation5 between
treated and untreated outcomes for any individual. The first assumption on wage effects
we considered, that there are none or they only affect enrollment decisions for children who
would enroll without the CCT, generates the maximum possible rank correlation between
a child’s enrollment decision with and without the CCT. The third assumption, that wage
effects have the same impact regardless of enrollment status without the CCT, generates
a rank correlation of zero. As we have seen, different rank correlations generate different
predictions for the change in enrollment caused by the CCT in location a.
How close should the rank correlation we use to predict the effect of the CCT on enroll-
ment in location a be to the maximum possible? I consider two options. First, we might
specify a range of plausible values. In this example, we might be conservative and consider
rank correlations between zero and the maximum possible. Then, the gain in enrollment in
location a lies between 16 and
1
4 . A second option is to explore the strength of assumptions
on dependence required to draw specific conclusions about the effect of the program. For
example, we might consider what we need to assume about dependence to conclude that the
CCT will have a positive effect on enrollment. With an enrollment rate of 12 in location a,
a zero effect on enrollment in location a is only possible when the rank correlation between
enrollment with and without the CCT is the minimum possible, which is what occurs in the
second case we considered, when children who enroll without the CCT all drop out with
the CCT. Since this case is highly implausible, we would feel confident in our conclusion
that the CCT will have a positive effect on enrollment location a.
Note the key role played by the enrollment rate without the CCT in location a. If
instead of 12 , the enrollment rate in location a were
2
3 , choosing a rank correlation between
zero and the maximum possible would predict an increase in the enrollment rate due to
the CCT between 0 and 16 . We would need stronger, but still believable, assumptions on
dependence to predict a positive effect on enrollment.
In the following two sections, I generalize the intuition developed here to settings where
5The standard Pearson product-moment correlation measures only linear dependence.
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we also have information about observed characteristics in the two populations, where
outcomes are non-binary and where our data about locations e and a come from samples.
Readers uninterested in the details of generalization may wish to skip to the empirical
results in sections 1.5 and 1.6.
1.3 Econometric setup
Suppose we are interested in the causal effect of a binary treatment T ∈ {0, 1} on an
observable outcome Y ∈ Y ⊆ R. Each individual is associated with two potential outcomes:
Y1 ∈ Y1 ⊆ Y is her outcome if she receives treatment and Y0 ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y is her outcome if
she does not. Only one of these two outcomes is ever observed, the other is hypothetical.
Mathematically, the observed outcome Y can be written as:
Y = TY1 + (1− T )Y0.
Because both the observed and hypothetical outcome are defined for each individual we can
also define an individual’s own treatment effect ∆ ⊆ R:
∆ = Y1 − Y0
Our data come from two populations, indexed by D ∈ {e, a}. e is the population in which
the experimental evaluation of T was conducted and a is the alternative population of
interest. d-superscripts will index population-specific distributions and their attributes.
In population e, the experimental evaluation assigns T at random independently of all
other random variables with perfect compliance6. Therefore, we can identify the marginal
6Putting perfect compliance with treatment assignment another way, the estimands of interest will be
intention-to-treat (ITT) effects, including any participation decisions. The ITT is often thought to be the
object of policy interest since compliance can rarely be mandated in policy settings.
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distribution of untreated outcomes in population e, F eY0(y0), from the equality
F eY0(y0) = F
e
Y |T (y|T = 0)
where F eY |T (y|T = 0) denotes the marginal distribution of Y conditional on the treatment
indicator being equal to zero. The equality follows from the independence of the treatment
indicator from the potential outcomes. We can also identify the marginal distribution of
treated outcomes:
F eY1(y1) = F
e
Y |T (y|T = 1).
We can additionally identify any functionals of the outcome distributions, which allows us
to identify the average individual-specific treatment effect ∆ in population e:
Ee[∆] = Ee[Y1 − Y0]
= Ee[Y1]− Ee[Y0]
= Ee[Y1|T = 1]− Ee[Y0|T = 0] = Ee[Y |T = 1]− Ee[Y |T = 0].
Ed stands for the expectation with respect to the distribution in D = d.
As in previous sections, I maintain the assumption that all members of the alternative
population are untreated for concreteness. So T = 0 for all individuals in population a.
This means that in population a, we identify that distribution of untreated outcomes:
F aY0(y0) = F
a
Y |T (y|T = 0) = F aY (y).
We are, however, interested in the average treatment effect in alternative population, Ea[∆],
which depends on our ability to identify Ea[Y1]:
Ea[∆] = Ea[Y1 − Y0]
13
= Ea[Y |T = 1]− Ea[Y |T = 0]
= Ea[Y1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown
−Ea[Y ].
If the treatment effect were constant for all individuals and equal to ∆, Ea[∆] would simply
be equal to Ee[∆]. However, theory rarely implies a constant treatment effect and we can
often reject it empirically, see e.g. Heckman et al. (1997); Djebbari and Smith (2008). In
fact, theory usually predicts heterogeneity in treatment response depending on the individ-
ual and her context’s observed and unobserved attributes.
To demonstrate the role of heterogeneity in observed and unobserved characteristics on
the average treatment effect in a, I now introduce some additional notation. Suppose we
observe a vector of covariates X ∈ X ⊆ RdX for each individual. Additionally, suppose
there is a vector of unobserved covariates U ∈ U ⊆ RdU that we believe affects the outcome.
Concretely, we can think of the observed covariates in the remedial education example from
the introduction: the student’s grade level competency when entering third grade, class
size and gender. The unobserved covariates might be her latent ability and any parental
inputs. An equivalent representation for the potential outcomes is that treatment status and
covariates combine to produce the outcome through a function common across populations,
g : {0, 1} × X × U → R. In this representation, the potential outcomes are:
Y0 =g(0, X, U)
Y1 =g(1, X, U).
The individual-specific treatment effect is
∆ = Y1 − Y0 = g(1, X, U)− g(0, X, U),
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which will in general depend on both X and U . Our target, Ea[∆] can be written as:
ATEa =Ea[Y1 − Y0]
=
∫
X×U
g(1, x, u)− g(0, x, u)dF aX,U (x, u)
where F aX,U (x, u) denotes the joint distribution of observed and unobserved covariates in
population a. Note that F aX,U (x, u) in general differs from F
e
X,U (x, u). Iterating expecta-
tions, ATEa can be written in three equivalent ways:
ATEa =
∫
X
[∫
U
g(1, x, u)− g(0, x, u)dF aU |X(u|x)
]
dF aX(x) (1.1)
=
∫
X
[∫
R2
y1 − y0dF aY0,Y1|X(y0, y1|x)
]
dF aX(x) (1.2)∫
X
[∫
R
δdF a∆|X(δ|x)
]
dF aX(x) (1.3)
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) show that ATEa depends on the distribution of Y0, Y1|X,D = a,
which itself depends on the distribution of U |X,D = a. Equation (1.3) makes the connection
to the distribution of treatment effects for individuals with a particular value of the observed
covariates. Note that the equivalence of equations (1.1) and (1.2) shows that the invariance
to the population indicator of the function generating outcomes is without loss of generality,
since the dimension of U is unrestricted and could include a separate indicator for each
population, analogous to defining the d-index of F dY1,Y0,X(y1, y0|x) as an element of U .
1.3.1 Previous methods
Within this general setup, I now describe previous methods for using the distributions
from the experimental population to identify the average treatment effect in the alternative
population.
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Conditional independence of the gains
The standard approach to extrapolating the results of social experiments has been to
reweight the average treatment effects conditional on each value of the observed covari-
ates by the distribution of observed covariates in the population of interest. That is:
ATEa =
∫
X
Ee[Y1 − Y0|x]dF aX(x). (1.4)
This estimator is justified on the basis of the following assumptions (Allcott (2015)):
X a ⊆ X e (1.5)
∆ ⊥⊥ D|X (1.6)
where X a denotes the support of X in the alternative population, X e denotes the support in
the experimental population and ⊥⊥ denotes statistical independence7. (1.5) is a standard
condition required for non-parametric extrapolation. (1.6) is the key identification assump-
tion. Note that under (1.6), ∆ = Y1 − Y0 is independent of any difference between the
conditional distributions of untreated outcomes, F aY0(y0|x) and F eY0(y0|x). With a bounded
outcome, the conditional distributions of control outcomes may be such that (1.6) is im-
possible. For one extreme example, consider the case where Y ∈ {0, 1}, and the outcomes
in population in population e are as in section 1.2, with Ee[Y0] =
1
3 and E
e[Y1] =
2
3 .
Ee[∆] = 13 . If Y = 1 for all individuals in population a, (1.6) cannot hold. Predictions will
also depend on the scaling of Y , for example, whether it is measured in levels or logs8.
Even more substantively, differences in the conditional distributions of control outcomes
are indicative of some unobserved differences between the experimental population and the
7The estimator in equation (1.4) can be justified on the basis of a weaker mean-independence assumption,
but I will focus on the assumptions considered in the literature.
8(1.4) is analogous to the counterfactual portion of a difference-in-differences estimator, where the as-
sumption is that the mean difference in outcomes is conditionally independent of the population indicator.
Hence, these standard criticisms of difference-in-differences estimators as non-invariant to scaling of the out-
come and possibly delivering predictions outside the support of the outcome variable, as described in Athey
and Imbens (2006) for example, apply here as well.
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population of interest. To see this, note that:
F dY0|X(y0|x) = F dg(0,x,U)(g(0, x, U)).
Then
F aY0|X(y0|x) 6= F eY0|X(y0|x) =⇒ F aU |X(u|x) 6= F eU |X(u|x).
If the elements of U whose difference in conditional distribution produce the difference in the
conditional distribution of control outcomes also influence the individual-specific treatment
effect, (1.6) will not hold.
Conditional independence of the potential outcomes
Due to some combination of these criticisms, the primary assumption used in the theoretical
literature on extrapolation of experimental results combines (1.5) with the assumption that
the joint distribution of potential outcomes is independent of the population conditional on
the observed covariates:
(Y0, Y1) ⊥⊥ D|X (1.7)
or equivalently, that all unobserved covariates determining the outcome are independent of
the population indicator:
U ⊥⊥ D|X
It is straightforward to show that (1.7) implies Ea[Y1|x] = Ee[Y1|x] so that we can identify
the average treatment effect in the population of interest by reweighting the expectation
of the treated outcome from the experimental population conditional on covariates by the
distribution of covariates in the population of interest and subtracting the expected control
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outcome from the population of interest:
ATEa =
∫
X
Ee[Y1|x]dF aX(x)− Ea[Y0].
For (1.7) to hold, the conditional distributions of control outcomes must be the same
in the two populations. Therefore Hotz et al. (2005) and papers following them have sug-
gested testing equality of the distributions or their moments. Two issues come up when
testing F eY0|X(y0|x) = F aY0|X(y0|x) and using the result to conclude whether or not we can
generalize results from the experiment to the population of interest. First, considering the
small sample sizes of many social experiments, we may often be underpowered to reject
equality of the conditional outcome distributions, as raised in Flores and Mitnik (2013).
Second, if we do reject the null hypothesis, we must conclude that the experiment tells
us nothing about ATEa. Again, this may be an issue of sample size: with large sam-
ples from both the experimental population and the population of interest we will in all
likelihood reject the null. Furthermore, there is an issue of degree. Suppose we have two
alternative populations of interest a and a′ and our samples are large enough to reject both
F eY0|X(y0|x) = F aY0|X(y0|x) and F eY0|X(y0|x) = F a
′
Y0|X(y0|x) but F aY0|X(y0|x) is quite similar to
F eY0|X(y0|x) while F a
′
Y0|X(y0|x) is quite different, it seems inappropriate to conclude that the
results from e are equally (and completely) uninformative in predicting the average causal
effect in both a and a′. In the following section, I depart from the testing framework and
derive bounds on the average causal effect in the population of interest as a function of the
differences in the conditional distributions of control outcomes between the population of
interest and the experimental population. I conclude this section with a simple example.
1.3.2 Example: remedial education in India
To make the above discussion concrete, I now describe a simple parametric model using the
example of remedial education India. Suppose students from the city of Mumbai represent
the experimental population, e, and students from the city of Vadodara the alternative
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population, a, where we would like to predict the average treatment effect. We will leave
the observed covariates X as a vector, but break the vector U into the two components
discussed above, latent skill S and parental input I. g(·) is a linear production function
with different parameters depending on treatment status
g(0, X, S, I) = β0 + β
′
0XX + β0SS + β0II = Y0
g(1, X, S, I) = β1 + β
′
1XX + β1SS + β1II = Y1
Note that once we assume linearity, the commonality of g(·) across populations is no longer
without loss of generality. In this case, the individual-specific treatment effect, ∆, is
∆ =Y1 − Y0
=(β1 − β0)
+ (β′1X − β′0X)X
+ (β1S − β0S)S
+ (β1I − β0I)I
Our objective is to identify:
ATEa =Ea[Y1 − Y0]
=(β1 − β0)
+ Ea
[
(β′1X − β′0X)X
]
+ Ea [(β1S − β0S)S]
+ Ea [(β1I − β0I)I]
The four elements of ATEa are, respectively, a treatment effect common to all students,
the average deviation from the common treatment effect due to observables in population
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a, the average deviation from the common effect due to latent skill in population a and the
average deviation from the common effect due to the parental input. When β′1X 6= β′0X ,
there is treatment effect heterogeneity due to observable covariates and when β1S 6= β0S or
β1I 6= β0I there is treatment effect heterogeneity due to unobservables.
ATEe alone will in general be biased as an estimator for ATEa, with the bias taking
the following form:
ATEe −ATEa =(β′1X − β′0X)(Ee[X]− Ea[X])
+ (β1S − β0S)(Ee[S]− Ea[S])
+ (β1I − β0I)(Ee[I]− Ea[I])
The bias depends on the differences between sites in the marginal distributions of charac-
teristics along which treatment effects are heterogeneous.
In this simple example, we need Ea[S|x] = Ee[S|x] if β1S 6= β0S and Ea[I|x] = Ee[I|x]
if β1I 6= β0I for conditional independence of the gains, (1.6), to hold. We need Ea[S|x] =
Ee[S|x] if (β0S , β1S) 6= (0, 0) and Ea[I|x] = Ee[I|x] if (β0I , β1I) 6= (0, 0) for conditional
independence of the potential outcomes, (1.7), to hold. We will return to this parametric
model to build intuition for key points in the next section as well.
1.4 Bounds on ATEa using differences in the untreated outcome distri-
butions
1.4.1 Identification
In investigating the role of the conditional untreated outcome distributions in determining
the average causal effect in the population of interest, recall first that since we can already
identify Ea[Y0] (simply the expected outcome in the population of interest), what we need
to identify Ea[Y1]−Ea[Y0] is the counterfactual Ea[Y1]. The expected value of the treated
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outcome in the population of interest can be written as follows:
Ea[Y1] =
∫
X
∫
R
∫
R
y1 dF
a
Y1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unidentified
 dF aY0|X(y0|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
identified
 dF aX(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
identified
(1.8)
We are missing information on the distribution of treated outcomes that individuals with a
particular untreated outcome would experience in the population of interest. Since no one
is treated in the population of interest, for information on this object, we must turn to the
experimental population.
For the experiment to tell us anything about F aY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x), we must first impose
two support conditions.
Assumption 1. The support of X in the population of interest is a subset of the support
in the experimental population: X a ⊆ X e.
Assumption 2. The support of Y0|X = x in the population of interest is a subset of
the support in the experimental population for all values of X in the support of X in the
population of interest: Suppa(Y0|X = x) ⊆ Suppe(Y0|X = x) ∀x ∈ X a.
Assumption 1 is the same as employed in the previous literature (see equation (1.5)).
Assumption 2 will be needed to nonparametrically tie differences in the conditional dis-
tributions of untreated outcomes to differences in the conditional distributions of treated
outcomes. I will explore alternative assumptions when these are violated in an extension.
Turning now to the question of identification of F aY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x) using information
from the experiment, we first observe that there are many possible covariate-and-untreated-
outcome-conditional distributions FY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x) associated with the covariate-conditioned
marginal untreated outcome F eY0|X(y0|x) and treated outcome distributions F eY1|X(y1|x).
Specifically, FY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x) is a valid conditional distribution for the marginal distribu-
tions F eY0,X(y0|x) and F eY1|X(y1|x) if
FY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x) = C1(F eY0,X(y0|x), F eY1|X(y1|x)|x)
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where C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] is a copula function (see appendix 1.8 for the definition), and
C1(v, w|x) = ∂C(v,w|x)∂v . Informally, a copula function is a bivariate CDF where both ar-
guments are defined on the unit interval which fully determines a dependence structure
between the untreated and treated outcomes in the experimental population for individu-
als with the same covariates. A copula function combined with the marginal distributions
of untreated (F eY0,X(y0|x)) and treated outcomes (F eY1|X(y1|x)) defines a joint distribution
(FY0,Y1|X(y0, y1|x)) consistent with those marginal distributions. FY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x) is the
conditional distribution associated with the joint distribution FY0,Y1|X(y0, y1|x). Let C de-
note the set of valid copula functions.
I will assume that the distribution of treated outcomes conditional on an untreated
outcome and observed covariates in the alternative population of interest is consistent with
the experimental results.
Assumption 3. Consistency of the conditional distribution of treated outcomes in the pop-
ulation of interest with the experimental results:
F aY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x) = C1(F eY0|X(y0|x), F eY1|X(y1|x)|x)
for some copula function C ∈ C.
Assumption 3 states that we must be able to express the distribution of the treated
outcome conditional on an untreated outcome and covariates as one of the conditional
distributions consistent with the distributions of untreated and treated outcomes in the
experiment.
To make Assumption 3 more concrete, I illustrate two examples of copula functions
and show how they define a joint distribution of potential outcomes FY0,Y1|X(y0, y1|x). Let
QeY0|X(α|x) denote the α-quantile of Y0|X in the experimental population and QeY1|X(α|x)
the α-quantile of Y1|X in the experimental population. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show two
possible copulas and the joint distributions they define. The arrows in the figures represent
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dependence relationships between F eY0|X(y0|x) and F eY1|X(y1|x) defined by the copulas. The
horizontal arrows in figure 1.2 represent the joint distribution Y0, Y1|X in the experimental
population when the treatment preserves individuals’ ranks in the outcome distributions
perfectly. In the example of remedial education in India, the highest-scoring student without
a remedial education teacher assigned to her school would still be the highest-scoring student
with a remedial education teacher assigned. The crossing arrows in figure 1.3 represent the
case when the treatment reverses ranks: the highest scoring student without the treatment
would be the lowest-scoring student without the treatment.
Figure 1.2: Perfect positive dependence of F eY0|X(y0|x), F eY1|X(y1|x)
Control outcomes Treated outcomes
...
QeY0|X(.95|x)
...
QeY0|X(.5|x)
...
QeY0|X(.05|x)
...


...
QeY1|X(.95|x)
...
QeY1|X(.5|x)
...
QeY1|X(.05|x)
...

1
A joint distribution F eY0,Y1|X(y0, y1|x) consistent with the experimental marginal dis-
tributions of control and treated outcomes also determines the extent of heterogeneity in
treatment effects for individuals with covariates x. When the treatment perfectly preserves
individuals’ ranks in the outcome distributions, treatment effect heterogeneity due to unob-
servables is minimized. That is, conditional on x, the individual-specific treatment effects
∆ have the the smallest magnitude possible. In contrast, when the treatment inverts indi-
viduals’ ranks in the outcome distributions, the treatment effects have the largest possible
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magnitude.
Figure 1.3: Perfect negative dependence of F eY0|X(y0|x), F eY1|X(y1|x)
Control outcomes Treated outcomes
...
QeY0|X(.95|x)
...
QeY0|X(.5|x)
...
QeY0|X(.05|x)
...


...
QeY1|X(.95|x)
...
QeY1|X(.5|x)
...
QeY1|X(.05|x)
...

1
The relationship between Y0|X and Y1|X under perfect positive dependence is known
as comonotonicity, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Comonotonicity. When two random variables V and W are comonotonic
FV,W (v, w) = min {FV (v), FW (w)} .
A necessary condition for Assumption 3 is that if the control outcomes conditional on a
value of the covariates have the same distribution in the experimental population and the
population of interest, the conditional treated outcomes have the same distribution as well.
That is,
F aY0|X(y0|x) = F eY0|X(y0|x) =⇒ F aY1|X(y1|x) = F eY1|X(y1|x).
A sufficient condition but stronger than necessary condition is that the distribution of
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the treated outcomes be the same across populations once we have conditioned on a value
of the control outcome and the observed covariates, an assumption also used in Athey and
Imbens (2006). Formally:
Y1 ⊥⊥ D|Y0, X (1.9)
This is the relevant condition to answer the hypothetical, what would the conditional dis-
tribution of treated outcomes have been in the experiment had the distribution of control
outcomes been the same as in the population of interest (see Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo
(2011))? In terms of the underlying unobservables, a sufficient condition for (1.9), in turn,
is:
U ⊥⊥ D|g(0, x, U) = y0, X = x.
Finally, we require existence of the expectation of Y1 in e.
Assumption 4. Y1 has finite expectation in e: E
e [|Y1|] <∞.
Combining assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, we state the following result.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4:
Ea[Y1 − Y0|x] ∈
[{
min
C∈C
∫
R
(∫
R
y1dC1(F
e
Y0(y0|x), F eY1(y1|x)|x)
)
dF aY0(y0|x)
}
− Ea[Y0|x],{
max
C∈C
∫
R
(∫
R
y1dC1(F
e
Y0(y0|x), F eY1(y1|x)|x)
)
dF aY0(y0|x)
}
− Ea[Y0|x]
]
Bounds on the unconditional average treatment effect in the population of interest can
then be recovered by weighting the minimal and maximal conditional average treatment
effects by the distribution of covariates in the population of interest.
ATEa ∈
[∫
X
min Ea[Y1 − Y0|x]dF aX(x),
∫
X
max Ea[Y1 − Y0|x]dF aX(x)
]
(1.10)
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All of the objects in proposition 1 are identified, with the exception of the copula C. We
minimize and maximize over the set of possible copulas C to obtain the bounds. The bounds
defined in proposition 1 are sharp by construction, since each element of C defines a valid
possible conditional distribution F aY1|Y0,X(y1|y0, x).
By considering the full set of possible copulas, we consider copulas that may not be
credible, however. In particular, the dependence structure shown in figure 1.3 is not re-
alistic in most applications. In the remedial education example, it is clearly unrealistic
to believe that the highest-performing students when no remedial education teacher is as-
signed to their school become the lowest-performing when a remedial education teacher is
assigned. Unless remedial education is so effective that a poor-performing student with-
out treatment becomes the best-performing student, the best-performing student without
treatment’s rank in the outcomes distribution is likely unaffected: she is not assigned to
work with the remedial education teacher and remains the highest-performing. We typi-
cally anticipate some positive dependence between outcomes with and without treatment
for any one individual, with the degree of dependence (and thus of unobserved treatment
effect heterogeneity) depending on the application.
We therefore index copulas by the degree of dependence in the joint distributions of
control and treated outcomes they generate. We use Normalized Spearman’s ρ, defined
below, to measure dependence.
Definition 2. For any two random variables V and W , Normalized Spearman’s ρ is given
by:
ρ(V,W ) =
CorC(R(V ), R(W ))
CorM (R(V ), R(W ))
where R(V ) = FV (v) when V is continuously distributed and R(V ) =
FV (v)+FV (v−)
2 when V
takes a finite number of values and equivalently forW . The notation FV (v−) denotes P (V <
v) and equivalently for W . CorC(R(V ), R(W )) refers to the product-moment correlation
between R(V ) and R(W ) under copula C:
∫ (
R(V )− 12
) (
R(W )− 12
)
dC(FV (v), FW (w)).
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CorM (R(V ), R(W )) is the product-moment correlation between R(V ) and R(W ) under
comonotonicity:
∫ (
R(V )− 12
) (
R(W )− 12
)
d (min {FV (V ), FW (w)}).
The definition of Normalized Spearman’s ρ coincides with the standard calculation of
Spearman’s ρ in the numerator (see Nesˇlehova´ (2007)). In the denominator, when V and
W are continuously distributed,
∫ (
R(V )− 12
) (
R(W )− 12
)
d (min {FV (V ), FW (w)})=1 so
that the calculation is completely standard. However, when V and W take a finite number
of values,
∫ (
R(V )− 12
) (
R(W )− 12
)
d (min {FV (V ), FW (w)}) may be less than 1. So the
only difference with the standard calculation is the normalization in the discrete case.
We can produce bounds on Ea[Y1−Y0|x] subject to the restriction that we only consider
copula functions generating dependence greater than a specified level. This is represented
in the following assumption and proposition.
Assumption 5. C is an element of C(ρL), the set of copula functions such that ρ(Y0, Y1|X =
x) ≥ ρL where ρL ∈ [0, 1] .
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5:
Ea[Y1 − Y0|x] ∈
[{
min
C∈C(ρL)
∫
R
(∫
R
y1dC1(F
e
Y0(y0|x), F eY1(y1|x)|x)
)
dF aY0(y0|x)
}
− Ea[Y0|x],{
max
C∈C(ρL)
∫
R
(∫
R
y1dC1(F
e
Y0(y0|x), F eY1(y1|x)|x)
)
dF aY0(y0|x)
}
− Ea[Y0|x]
]
.
Bounds on the unconditional ATEa can be computed in the same way as under propo-
sition 1 (equation (1.10)). C(1) is a singleton and the bounds shrink to a point. We now
investigate the structure underlying the potential outcomes as a means of interpreting the
results and assumptions.
1-dimensional unobservables generate comonotonicity
Suppose an individual’s control and treated potential outcomes, Y0 and Y1, are both gen-
erated by a single unobserved characteristic of the individual so that U is one-dimensional
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and the structural functions g(0, x, u) and g(1, x, u) are each weakly increasing in u. It
is a standard result that this implies comonotonicity of the potential outcomes (see, for
example, the proof of proposition 5.16 in McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts (2005)).
Athey and Imbens (2006) use this characterization of Yt (however, in their difference-in-
differences setting T indexes time, rather than treatment), along with assumptions 1, 2 and
3 and the condition U ⊥⊥ T to yield an estimator they refer to as the changes-in-changes
model with conditional independence (see section 4.2 of Athey and Imbens (2006)). U ⊥⊥ T
by design in the experiment (T is randomly assigned independently of any other random
variable), so the changes-in-changes model with conditional independence is a valid estima-
tor for the point defined under proposition 2 when ρL = 1. When outcomes are continuous,
Athey and Imbens (2006) point out that assumption 3 is implied by monotonicity in u of
the function generating outcomes and thus does not need to be separately imposed.
Example. To gain some intuition for the identifying power of assuming g(0, x, u) and
g(1, x, u) are strictly increasing in 1-dimensional u, we return to the parametric example
introduced in section 1.3.2. Assume the parental input I is excluded from the production
function so unobservables are one-dimensional9 and the potential outcomes can be written
as
Y0 = β0 + β0XX + β0SS
Y1 = β1 + β1XX + β1SS
9This is not the only way to generate 1-dimensional unobservables in the linear production function
described in section 1.3.2. We could make use of a single index specification for the unobservables where
Y0 = β0 + β0XX + β0SS + β0II
Y1 = β1 + β1XX + κ(β0SS + β0II)
Alternatively, if S and I have a Pearson product-moment correlation of 1, we can write I as a linear
function of S (I = bS) so that:
Y0 = β0 + β0XX + (β0S + β0Ib)S
Y1 = β1 + β1XX + (β1S + β1Ib)S
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In this section I illustrate that with a one-dimensional unobservable, the way in which the
distributions of observables F eX,Y (x, y) in the experimental population change with treat-
ment status can be mapped into differences in the treatment and control structural func-
tions. This knowledge of the changes in the structural function can be applied to differences
in the distributions of observables in the control state, F eX,Y0(x, y0) and F
a
X,Y0
(x, y0), across
populations to recover Ea[Y1].
Let α = F eY0|X(y0|x) for a given value of y0. Consider the α quantiles of Y1|X and Y0|X
in e:
QeY1|X(α|x) = β1 + β′1Xx+ β1SQeS|X(α|x)
QeY0|X(α|x) = β0 + β′0Xx+ β0SQeS|X(α|x)
Making use of the linear functional form, we can subtract the x-subgroup, t-specific mean
from each quantile to remove the common and x-specific structural effects:
QeY1|X(α|x)− Ee[Y1|x] = β1S
(
QeS|X(α|x)− Ee[S|x]
)
QeY0|X(α|x)− Ee[Y0|x] = β0S
(
QeS|X(α|x)− Ee[S|x]
)
By dividing the e treatment group α-quantile-specific deviation from the x-subgroup specific
mean from the corresponding α-quantile-specific deviation in the e control group, we obtain
the ratio of the effects of the latent skill S in the treated and control states.
QeY1|X(α|x)− Ee[Y1|x]
QeY0|X(α|x)− Ee[Y0|x]
=
β1S
(
QeS|X(α|x)− Ee[S|x]
)
β0S
(
QeS|X(α|x)− Ee[S|x]
)
=
β1S
β0S
(1.11)
Knowing the ratio of the effects of latent math skill across treatment and control states
allows us to map differences in the distributions of latent skill and pre-test score F eX,S(x, s)
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and F aX,S(x, s) identified by differences in the joint distributions of the control outcomes
F eX,Y0(x, y0) and F
a
X,Y0
(x, y0) into differences in the observed treatment group distribution in
e, F eX,Y1(x, y1), and the unknown treated group distribution in a, F
a
X,Y1
(x, y1). Specifically,
consider:
Ea[Y0|x]− Ee[Y0|x] = β0S (Ea[S|x]− Ee[S|x]) .
Then we can use the change in the effect of unobservables from equation (1.11) to identify
the unknown expected value of the treated outcome conditional on covariates x.
Ea[Y1|x]− Ee[Y1|x] = β1S
β0S
(Ea[Y0|x]− Ee[Y0|x])
Ea[Y1|x] = β1S
β0S
(Ea[Y0|x]− Ee[Y0|x]) + Ee[Y1|x]
Finally, the conditional average treatment effect is obtained by subtracting the conditional
expectation of the test score in the population of interest.
Ea[Y1 − Y0|x] = β1S
β0S
(Ea[Y0|x]− Ee[Y0|x]) + Ee[Y1|x]− Ea[Y |x]
Multidimensional heterogeneity
However, when we introduce multidimensional heterogeneity, we can no longer cleanly apply
the knowledge we gain from the experiment about how the structural function g(t, x, u)
changes with treatment to the differences in F eX,Y0(x, y0) and F
a
X,Y0
(x, y0).
Example. This is easy to see in the parametric illustration when we reintroduce indepen-
dent variation in I. Consider the treatment-to-control ratio of α-quantile deviations from
the x-specific subgroup means in the experimental population:
QeY1|X(α|x)− Ee[Y1|x]
QeY0|X(α|x)− Ee[Y0|x]
=
Qeβ1SS+β1II(α|x)− Ee[β1SS + β1II|x]
Qeβ0SS+β0II(α|x)− Ee[β0SS + β0II|x]
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Whereas previously this ratio simplified to the treatment-to-control ratio of effects of latent
skill on the test score at the end of third grade, it no longer identifies any specific change
in the structural function. Put more generally, the α-quantile of Yt|x in the experimental
population now provides no structural information.
We will see in the next section that for very small deviations from 1-dimensional unob-
served heterogeneity, the bounds on the average treatment effect in the population of interest
expand substantially, depending on the extent of difference in the conditional distributions
of the control outcomes between the population of interest and the experimental popula-
tion. Only when unobserved heterogeneity is exactly, and not approximately, 1-dimensional
do differences in the conditional distributions of the control outcomes not lead to a loss in
identification. This motivates considering the bounds from proposition 2 and investigating
how they change with ρL.
1.4.2 Estimation
In estimation, I will consider the case when outcomes and covariates are discrete or dis-
cretized. I will illustrate both possibilities in the empirical work. When outcomes and
covariates are discrete, we can represent the optimization over the restricted space of copu-
las C(ρL) as a linear programming problem. In particular, the bounds on the average causal
effect in context a for individuals with covariates x admit a representation as the solution
to a discrete optimal transportation problem with a non-standard cost function and an ad-
ditional linear constraint on dependence (see Villani (2009) for a comprehensive discussion
of optimal transportation problems). Very efficient algorithms are available to solve linear
programs (see e.g. Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004)), so the bounds can be computed quickly
using software provided by the author.
A similar representation as a continuous optimal transportation problem exists when
outcomes are continuous, but there is no analogous tractable method to compute the so-
lution, which involves optimization over an infinite-dimensional space (C(ρL)). It may be
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possible to represent C(ρL) with a sieve space Cn(ρL), which would be finite-dimensional and
compact, becoming dense as n→∞. Exploring this possibility is left to future research. I
therefore impose the following assumption on outcomes and covariates.
Assumption 6. Finite support of the potential outcomes and covariates. Let J,K ∈ N.
Y0 and Y1 take values in Y0 = {y0,1, . . . , y0,j , . . . , y0J} and Y1 = {y1,1, . . . , y1,k, . . . , y1K},
respectively. Further, X takes values in a finite set X .
Linear programming representation
I first describe the linear programming representation of the bounds in Proposition 2. I
leave conditioning on x implicit to economize on notation. Given ρL, the upper bound is
obtained by solving the following linear programming problem with solution τU (ρL) (the
lower bound, τL(ρL) is obtained by replacing the max operator with min).
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τU (ρL) = max
C(ρL)
Ea[Y1 − Y0]
= max
{Pe(y0j ,y1k)}k=1,...,Kj=1,...,J
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
y1k
P a(y0j)
P e(y0j)
× P e(y0j , y1k) (1.12)
−
J∑
j=1
y0jP
a(y0j) (1.13)
subject to
K∑
k=1
P e(y0j , y1k) = P
e(y0j) ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J} (1.14)
J∑
j=1
P e(y0j , y1k) = P
e(y1k) ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K} (1.15)
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
R(y0j)− 1
2
)(
R(y1k)− 1
2
)
P e(y0j , y1k)
≥ ρL
[
max
{Pe(y0j ,y1k)}k=1,...,Kj=1,...,J
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(
R(y0j)− 1
2
)(
R(y1k)− 1
2
)
P e(y0j , y1k)
]
(1.16)
P e(y0j , y1k) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}, k ∈ {1, ...,K}
Maximization is with respect to the elements of the matrix defining the joint distribution
of Y0 and Y1 in population e, {P e(y0j , y1k)}k=1,...,Kj=1,...,J . Line (1.13) is simply a normalization
so that the value of the objective function of the problem can be interpreted as Ea[Y1−Y0].
Constraints (1.14) and (1.15) require that the minimizing/maximizing joint distribution be
consistent with the marginal outcome distributions in e. Constraint (1.16) enforces that
Normalized Spearman’s ρ (see Definition 2) applied to the potential outcomes Y0 and Y1,
ρ(Y0, Y1), may not be below ρ
L. Constraints (1.14), (1.15) and (1.16) make maximizing
over the elements of the joint distribution of Y0 and Y1 equivalent to maximizing over the
restricted space of copulas, C(ρL) (proof in Appendix 1.9).
The coefficients on the elements of {P e(y0j , y1k)}k=1,...,Kj=1,...,J are
{
y1k
Pa(y0j)
P e(y0j)
}k=1,...,K
j=1,...,J
. To-
gether with constraint (1.15), this shows the role of the distributions of control outcomes
{P a(y0j)}j=1,...,J and {P e(y0j)}j=1,...,J in determining the bounds. If P a(y0) = P e(y0),
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Pa(y0)
P e(y0)
= 1 and constraint (1.15) implies that the counterfactual Ea[Y1] = E
e[Y1]
10. All
else equal, in order to maximize the objective function, we would like to assign higher prob-
ability to high values on the support of Y1 (high k) when
Pa(y0j)
P e(y0j)
is large and to low values
on the support of Y1 (low k) when
Pa(y0j)
P e(y0j)
is small. However, constraint (1.16) limits our
ability to do so.
Example. Table 1.5 shows the choice variables and constraints 1.14 and 1.15 in the context
of the remedial education in India example where the city of Mumbai is treated as e and
Vadodara as a. As will be discussed in more detail in section 1.6, I do not use the test score
directly as an outcome, but rather the discrete grade level competency of third graders
when completing third grade. In table 1.5, I condition on a competency level of zero on
entering third grade. The row and column labeled “All” represents the constraints on the
marginal distributions P e(y0|x) and P e(y1|x). Without further constraints, the values of
the choice variables are restricted only by the requirement that the sums across rows (for
the untreated outcomes) equal the probability in the column labeled “All control” and that
the sums down the columns (for the treated outcomes) equal the probability in the row
labeled “All treated.”
Table 1.6 shows the coefficient on each choice variable P e(y0j , y1k) when Mumbai is
treated as e and we condition on students’ grade-level competency being zero on entering
third grade. We can see that the differences in the distributions of control outcomes mean
10
Proof.
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
y1kP
e(y0j , y1k)
=
J∑
j=1
y1k
K∑
k=1
P e(y0j , y1k)
=
J∑
j=1
y1kP
e(y1k) = E
e[Y1]
where the second equality follows from substituting in constraint (1.15).
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Table 1.5: Choice variables, e =Mumbai
Remedial education
Competency on exiting grade 3
0 1 2 3 All control
N
o
re
m
ed
ia
l
ed
C
o
m
p
et
en
cy 0 P e(0, 0) P e(0, 1) P e(0, 2) P e(0, 3) 0.73
1 P e(1, 0) P e(1, 1) P e(1, 2) P e(1, 3) 0.17
2 P e(2, 0) P e(2, 1) P e(2, 2) P e(2, 3) 0.07
3 P e(3, 0) P e(3, 1) P e(3, 2) P e(3, 3) 0.03
All treated 0.66 0.2 0.1 0.04
that we would maximize the objective function by ascribing the highest treatment effects
to individuals with Y0 = 1 and the lowest treatment effects to individuals with Y0 = 3.
Constraint (1.16) on the dependence between Y0 and Y1 in Mumbai limits our ability
to do so arbitrarily. Recall that ρL governs the allowed deviations from 1-dimensional
heterogeneity. To gain some intuition for the joint distributions implied by different values
of ρL, table 1.7 shows the joint distribution implied by ρL = 1 when Mumbai is treated
as e and we condition on students’ grade-level competency being zero on entering third
grade. When ρL = 1, the 1-dimensional heterogeneity case, the majority of the mass in the
joint distribution lies on the principal diagonal. Most individuals (88%) have a treatment
effect of zero, with a few individuals experiencing a positive treatment effect of at most 1
competency level.
Table 1.6: Contribution of choice variables to the objective, e =Mumbai
Remedial education
Competency on exiting grade 3
0 1 2 3
N
o
re
m
ed
ia
l
ed
C
o
m
p
et
en
cy 0 0 0.71 2×0.71 3×0.71
1 0 2.26 2×2.26 3×2.26
2 0 1.16 2×1.16 3×1.16
3 0 0.60 2×0.60 3×0.60
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Table 1.7: P e(y0j , y1k|competency on entering third grade = 0), ρL = 1 e =Mumbai
Remedial education
Competency on exiting grade 3
0 1 2 3 All Control
N
o
re
m
ed
ia
l
ed
C
om
p
et
en
cy 0 0.66 0.07 0 0 0.73
1 0 0.13 0.04 0 0.17
2 0 0 0.06 0.01 0.07
3 0 0 0 0.03 0.03
All Treatment 0.66 0.2 0.1 0.04
Sample counterparts estimator
The solutions to the linear programming representation conditional on observed covariates
x and minimum rank correlation ρL, τLx (ρ
L) and τUx (ρ
L) when minimizing and maximizing
respectively, are functions of the population objects {P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ,
{P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K and {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J . We can write
τLx (ρ
L) = φL
(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ; ρL
)
(1.17)
where φL : ∆(Y0)×∆(Y1)×∆(Y0)→ R and ∆(Z) denotes the unit simplex on an arbitrary
finite set Z. We can similarly write
τUx (ρ
L) = φU
(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ; ρL
)
(1.18)
where φU : ∆(Y0) ×∆(Y1) ×∆(Y0) → R. In terms of φL(·) and φU (·), the bounds on the
unconditional ATEa (τ(ρL)) with ρL specified are as follows.
τ(ρL) ∈ [τL(ρL), τU (ρL)][∑
x∈X
φL
(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ; ρL
)
P a(x),
∑
x∈X
φU
(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ; ρL
)
P a(x)
]
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The bounds can be estimated by replacing population objects with their sample counter-
parts, denoted with hats.
[τˆL(ρL), τˆU (ρL)] =[∑
x∈X
φL
({
Pˆ e(y0j |X = x)
}
j=1,...,J
,
{
Pˆ e(y1k|X = x)
}
k=1,...,K
,
{
Pˆ a(y0j |X = x)
}
j=1,...,J
; ρL
)
Pˆ a(x),
∑
x∈X
φU
({
Pˆ e(y0j |X = x)
}
j=1,...,J
,
{
Pˆ e(y1k|X = x)
}
k=1,...,K
,
{
Pˆ a(y0j |X = x)
}
j=1,...,J
; ρL
)
Pˆ a(x)
]
.
1.4.3 Inference
Imbens and Manski (2004) provide confidence intervals with a fixed asymptotic coverage
probability of containing the true value of a partially-identified parameter under the high-
level assumption that the joint distribution of the bounds on the parameter is bivariate
Gaussian. These could in principle be used to compute confidence intervals covering the
true value of the average causal effect in context a, conditional on a specific value for ρL,
with fixed probability. However, the asymptotic distribution of the bounds is not available
in closed form, so I compute them using the bootstrap. The distribution of the bounds in
bootstrap samples will be asymptotically normal, satisfying the assumption in Imbens and
Manski (2004), under the following assumption.
Assumption 7. (i) Sampling. (Yi, Ti) for i = 1, . . . , N
e in population e are i.i.d. con-
ditional on Xi = x. (Yi, Ti) for i = 1, . . . , N
a, in population a are i.i.d, where Ti =
0 ∀i conditional on Xi = x. (ii) For each x in X , there exists a neighborhood of Vx of(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J
)
such that
φL
(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ; ρL
)
and
φU
(
{P e(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J , {P e(y1k|X = x)}k=1,...,K , {P a(y0j |X = x)}j=1,...,J ; ρL
)
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(defined in equations 1.17 and 1.18) are differentiable on Vx for all ρ
L in [0, 1].
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5, 611 hold. Let P be the set of distribu-
tions for which Assumption 7 holds. Then, limN→∞ infP∈P,τ(ρL)∈[τL(ρL),τU (ρL)]P (τ(ρL) ∈
CIN (ρ
L))≥ 1− α.
1.5 Transfers to Mexican microenterprises
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) (henceforth MW) document the results of an experiment
they carried out in 2006 (baseline Oct. 2005) in Leon, Mexico. The experiment was intended
to investigate the returns to measured profits of loosening credit constraints for small scale
male microentrepreneurs by giving the microentrepreneurs transfers. The authors collected
data over the course of five quarterly waves, including the baseline. A treated group of
entrepreneurs was randomly assigned to receive a transfer and, conditional on assignment
to receiving a transfer, randomly assigned a wave to receive the transfer. The transfers
were valued at 1,500 pesos (about $140). Half the transfers were randomly determined to
be in-kind, which meant that a member of the survey team accompanied the entrepreneur
to purchase equipment or inputs of his choice.
To ensure that the transfers be significant relative to each firm’s scale of operation, the
authors restricted their initial sample to entrepreneurs with a capital stock valued at less
than 10,000 pesos and no paid employees. Entrepreneurs had to be working full-time on
their firm (35 or more hours per week). They further restricted the sample to entrepreneurs
working in retail between the ages of 22 and 55. In baseline specifications, the authors find
that the transfers increase average monthly profits by about 40% of the transfer.
I explore the extent to which we can generalize this striking finding to microentrepreneurs
with the same characteristics in urban Mexico in 2012. The Leon experiment is uniquely
suited to this exercise because the questionnaire used in the experiment was based on the
national microenterprise survey: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN). This en-
11Assumption 6 implies Assumption 4.
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sures that variables are measured in approximately the same way, which has been shown
to be important when using information from one dataset to learn about counterfactual
potential outcomes in another - in this case treated outcomes (see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura,
and Todd (1997); Diaz and Handa (2006)). I exclude entrepreneurs from the 2012 ENAMIN
using the same criteria as MW, additionally requiring that the entrepreneurs be working in
urban areas since ENAMIN also captures entrepreneurs in rural area. Since sample selec-
tion already chooses a restricted set of individuals, I do not condition on any covariates in
the analysis.
I trim profit reports of more than 20,000 pesos in both samples. This trimming keeps
slightly more observations than MW who exploit the panel structure and base their trim-
ming procedure on percentile changes in reported profits. Since ENAMIN is a cross-section,
I cannot implement a similar procedure and therefore choose a specific value for trimming.
Results are robust to choosing different values for trimming. After implementing the trim-
ming, I am left with 903 observations from the ENAMIN sample and 207 unique microen-
trepreneurs from the experiment.
Figure 1.4 (this and subsequent figures are collected at the end of the paper) shows
the outcome distributions in ENAMIN and the control group from the experiment, which
provide one key ingredient for the bounds. Since heaping is a substantial issue in reported
profits, particularly in ENAMIN, I first smooth profits using a kernel density estimator with
a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 750 pesos before discretizing to 500 peso (about $50)
bins. Figure 1.4 shows that the experimental control group and the ENAMIN sample have
similar outcome distributions, although the ENAMIN sample has substantially more very
low profit realizations.
We now explore implications of the differences in the distributions of untreated profits
for what we can learn about the average return to cash transfers in urban Mexico in 2012 on
the basis of the findings in MW. Figure 1.5 shows bounds (in black) on the average monthly
return to providing cash transfers as a function of the minimum rank correlation between
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untreated and treated outcomes allowed, ρL. The bounds shrink to a point when the rank
correlation between profits with and without transfers is the maximum possible. Imbens
and Manski (2004) 95% confidence regions (in translucent gray) are computed using 100
bootstrap replications for each ρL, clustering at the firm level for the experiment12. The
information in the plot is repeated in table 1.8.
We can draw two conclusions from the results. First, the overall similarity of the control
outcome distributions yield narrow bounds on the average return to transfers for male
microentrepreneurs in urban Mexico in 2012 for a wide range of possible dependence between
outcomes with and without cash transfers. And, second, the experimental sample size
is sufficiently small that the 95% confidence interval includes a zero effect on monthly
profits at all levels of dependence. We cannot reject a zero effect because the confidence
interval around the bounds takes into account three sources of uncertainty: 1) the small
sample size of the experiment (207 entrepreneurs), 2) the fact that our information on the
distribution of control outcomes in urban Mexico in 2012 also comes from a finite sample
(903 entrepreneurs) and 3) the difference in the distribution of untreated profits, particularly
for low profit reports.
Previous work (discussed in detail in section 1.3.1) suggested taking into account the
differences in the distributions of untreated outcomes by testing their equality (Hotz et al.
(2005)). The small size of the experimental sample renders us unable to reject equality of
the distributions (the p-value from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-based test is 0.92). Having been
unable to reject the equality of the untreated outcome distributions due to the small size of
the experimental sample, we would predict the average profits for male microentrepreneurs
in urban Mexico in 2012 to be equal to the average profits for the treated group measured
in the experiment, with the same confidence interval as in the experiment. The confidence
interval for the difference in treated and untreated profits would be smaller because the
sample from ENAMIN is larger so we would be able to reject a zero effect on transfers,
ignoring the existence of differences in the distributions of control outcomes. I am able to
12This requires replacing the individual-level indicator i with a cluster-level indicator g in Assumption 7.
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separately quantify the uncertainty due to the difference in the control outcome distributions
and the uncertainty due to the small sample in the Leon experiment13. Considering that
the small sample size of the experiment led MW to be cautious in drawing conclusions
from their results in-sample, it seems unintuitive that we should be able to draw stronger
conclusions about the returns in all urban Mexico. Of course, we do not know the returns
to transfers in urban Mexico in 2012, so we now turn to a setting where we can compare
predictions and measured causal effects.
Table 1.8: Bounds on the average return to cash transfers in urban Mexico in 2012 using
experimental data from McKenzie and Woodruff (2008)
Rank correlation 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
ATEa lower bound 0.008 0.020 0.034 0.052 0.077 0.222
ATEa upper bound 0.436 0.427 0.416 0.392 0.354 0.222
95% Imbens and Manski (2004)
confidence interval lower bound -0.264 -0.247 -0.245 -0.224 -0.174 -0.125
95% Imbens and Manski (2004)
confidence interval upper bound 0.726 0.723 0.693 0.705 0.638 0.569
1.6 Remedial education in India
Banerjee et al. (2007) (henceforth BCDL) evaluated a remedial education program imple-
mented by the same NGO, Pratham, in two Indian cities: Mumbai and Vadodara. Under
the program, Pratham provides government schools with a teacher to work with 15-20 stu-
dents in the third and fourth grade who have been identified as falling behind. The teacher
works with these students for about half the school day.
BCDL carried out the experimental evaluations in Mumbai and Vadodara over the
course of three years, from 2001 to 2003. The last year was primarily used to investigate
the persistence of effects of the program on learning, so I focus on the first two. In Mumbai,
13I do not take into account the substantial sample attrition that affected the experiment and is explored
in MW. MW conclude that the possibility of differential attrition between the experimental treatment and
control groups would not dramatically affect their results. Taking into account the possibility of differential
attrition would lead to wider bounds on the average return to the transfers than reported in figure 1.5 and
table 1.8.
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the experiment was carried out only among third graders in the first year of the evaluation,
while in the second year there were compliance issues, with only two-thirds of Mumbai
schools agreeing to participate. In Vadodara, both grade levels were represented in each of
the first two years but during the first year communal riots disturbed part of the school
year. Because of the compliance issues in Mumbai year 2 and the shorter duration of the
program in Vadodara year 1, it is harder to interpret the programs being evaluated in the
two cities as actually being the same in these periods. Therefore, I consider the Mumbai
population as made up of third graders surveyed during the first year of the experiment and
the Vadodara population as third graders surveyed in the second year of the experiment.
The researchers administered different achievement tests for both math and verbal skills
in the two samples, which poses a challenge in applying the bounds proposed here or existing
extrapolation methods in this dataset. Along with different questions, the two tests featured
different numbers of questions as well, with 30 questions on the Mumbai test and 50 on
the Vadodara test. As an alternative to using the raw test scores, I take advantage of the
fact that the test scores were mapped to the students’ grade level competency. Grade level
competency measures whether the student successfully answered questions showing mastery
of the subjects taught in each grade. This measure of achievement is used in the Annual
Status of Education Report, also affiliated with Pratham, to compare achievement across
Indian states. One final complication is that students may not achieve all competencies
below their maximum competency. For simplicity, I consider the maximum competency as
the outcome of interest.
With the exception of the test score and competency at baseline, relatively little data
on students are available consistently across the two samples. Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show
summary statistics for the maximum competency at baseline in the two populations as
well as students’ class size and gender. The populations are relatively balanced on gender,
while Mumbai classes are notably larger than those in Vadodara. BCDL find no evidence of
treatment effect heterogeneity on either of these characteristics, so I ignore them and focus
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on the maximum competency level at baseline.
Table 1.9: Vadodara
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Pre-test: maximum math competency 0.276 0.361
Pre-test: maximum verbal competency .613 .678
Male 0.497 0.5
Number of students in class 62.109 26.516
N 5819
Table 1.10: Mumbai
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Pre-test: maximum math competency 0.543 0.641
Pre-test: maximum verbal competency 1.991 1.113
Male 0.473 0.499
Number of students in class 89.506 40.233
N 4429
Table 1.11 shows the difference across cities in the unconditional effect of the remedial
education program on the average maximum math grade level competency. The first line
shows the average effect in Vadodara. In Vadodara, the program raised students’ maximum
grade level competency in math by 0.16 grade levels. The third line shows the uncondi-
tional bias in using the average treatment effect in Mumbai as an estimator for the average
treatment effect in Vadodara. The average effect in Mumbai is estimated at 0.059 grade
levels, 0.103 less than the Vadodara ATE and the difference is significant.
Table 1.12 shows the equivalent results for the maximum verbal competency. Here the
average effect again differs across cities, but the difference is not significant. For this reason,
I focus on examining the ability of extrapolation methods to account for the significant
difference in the effect of the remedial education program on the maximum grade-level
competency in math across cities.
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Table 1.11: City-specific average effects on maximum math grade level competency
Post-test: maximum math competency
Mumbai 0.020
(0.026)
Treatment 0.162∗∗∗
(0.024)
Treatment*Mumbai −0.103∗∗∗
(0.036)
Constant 0.709∗∗∗
(0.017)
Observations 10,248
R2 0.005
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.12: City-specific average effects on maximum verbal grade level competency
Post-test: maximum verbal competency
Mumbai 0.947∗∗∗
(0.028)
Treatment 0.071∗∗∗
(0.026)
Treatment*Mumbai 0.049
(0.039)
Constant 1.230∗∗∗
(0.018)
Observations 10,248
R2 0.199
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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1.6.1 Using Mumbai to predict Vadodara
We now move to trying to use the results from Mumbai and the Vadodara control group
to predict the average outcome level in the Vadodara treatment group. We can think of
this as the policy-making exercise of using the results from Mumbai year 1 to try to infer
the average treatment effect on math test scores of implementing the remedial education
program among Vadodara third graders in the following year. As in previous work, I
find that the average treatment effect in Vadodara predicted using by reweighting Mumbai
average treatment effects conditional on grade level competency on entering third grade is
biased, with the bias equal to half the Vadodara average treatment effect (bias of 0.081
grade level competencies with a standard error of 0.033).
The first step in the extrapolation methodology developed in Hotz et al. (2005) is testing
equality of the distributions of maximum grade level competency in math for the two control
groups. Visual inspection of the conditional distributions in figure 1.6 shows that they
are quite different. Table 1.13 confirms this impression statistically. The table shows the
distributions of grade level competency in math on leaving third grade in the control groups
in both cities in the BCDL experiments conditional on their grade level competency in math
on entering third grade. The last column of the panel labeled Vadodara shows the p-value
associated with a χ2 test of equality of each conditional distributions representing a grade
level competency on entering third grade. The test rejects at the 5% level for all values grade
level competencies on entering third grade. Following the Hotz et al. (2005) methodology,
we would conclude that we cannot learn anything about the causal effect in Mumbai from
the causal effect in Vadodara: the students in the two cities are too different.
Turning to the bounds developed in this paper, figure 1.7 plots bounds on the predicted
values of the average effect of the remedial education program on maximum math grade
level competencies in Vadodara as a function of the minimum rank correlation, ρL, between
outcomes with and without the remedial education for individuals with the same grade level
competency on entering third grade. The bounds are plotted in black, while the translucent
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Table 1.13: Controls - P( competency on exiting grade 3 | competency on entering grade 3)
Mumbai
Post-competency
0 1 2 3 N
Pre-competency
0 0.73 0.17 0.07 0.03 1246
1 0.39 0.28 0.19 0.13 468
2 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.23 254
3 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.53 51
Vadodara
Post-competency
0 1 2 3 N P(M = V)
Pre-competency
0 0.52 0.38 0.08 0.02 2094 <2.2e-16
1 0.28 0.50 0.15 0.07 647 3.834e-12
2 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.22 51 0.03195
3 - - - - 0 -
gray region represents a 95% Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval, based on 100
bootstrap replications14. Table 1.14 replicate the key results from figure 1.7 in tabular form.
A notable feature of the bounds is that they widen quickly with only small deviations
from the maximum possible rank correlation. This is due to the fact that the conditional
distributions of control outcomes differ substantially between Mumbai and Vadodara, as
we saw in figure 1.6 and table 1.13. A zero average treatment effect in Vadodara can only
be rejected using the Mumbai results if ρL > .925. The light gray line plots the measured
average effect of remedial education on maximum grade level competency in math from table
1.11, while the dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. In terms of the prediction
of the average increase in maximum grade level competency in math, we see that though
the point estimate with maximum rank correlation under-predicts the sample mean of the
maximum competency on leaving 3rd grade in Vadodara, the two estimates are fairly close
and the difference between the two is not statistically different from zero. Simply allowing
for 1-dimensional heterogeneity goes a long way toward accurately predicting the Vadodara
results.
14Additional replications, to be added, would smooth out the irregularities in the confidence intervals.
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Table 1.14: Bounds on the change in average grade level competency in Vadodara using
experimental results from Mumbai and untreated outcomes from Vadodara
Rank correlation 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.925 0.95 1
ATEa lower bound -0.145 -0.107 -0.062 -0.017 0.030 0.042 0.058 0.109
ATEa upper bound 0.366 0.364 0.345 0.321 0.287 0.278 0.268 0.109
95% Imbens and Manski (2004)
confidence interval lower bound -0.193 -0.155 -0.107 -0.058 -0.017 -0.011 0.007 0.039
95% Imbens and Manski (2004)
confidence interval upper bound 0.427 0.431 0.410 0.395 0.353 0.342 0.316 0.179
1.6.2 Using Vadodara to predict Mumbai
Figure 1.8 and table 1.15 show the results of using Vadodara to predict Mumbai. The
results show the difficulty that arises when there are some observed characteristics in the
region for which we want to predict the average causal effect that are not present in the
experimental results (Assumption 1). As shown in table 1.13, Vadodara does not include
any students who enter grade three with a third grade level competency while Mumbai
includes a small fraction of such students. The results in figure 1.8 assign these students
the lower bound of the support of the maximum grade level competency (0) when computing
the lower bound on the average causal effect in Mumbai and the upper bound of the support
of the competency (3) when computing the upper bound. As a result, we can only reject
zero average treatment effect in Mumbai using the Vadodara results under an even smaller
range of rank correlations between outcomes with and without the remedial education
program (< .975). Setting the mean treated outcome at zero competency for students
with a competency of three on entering third grade is almost surely too severe even when
computing the lower bound on the average treatment effect in Mumbai. I am currently
exploring alternatives such as assuming that the distribution of treated outcomes for this
group first-order stochastically dominates the distribution for students entering third grade
with a grade-level competency of two.
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Table 1.15: Bounds on change in average grade level competency in Mumbai using experi-
mental results from Vadodara and untreated outcomes from Mumbai
Rank correlation 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.925 0.975 1
ATEa lower bound -0.063 -0.051 -0.039 -0.020 0.006 0.019 0.049 0.089
ATEa upper bound 0.370 0.338 0.304 0.265 0.223 0.209 0.180 0.165
95% Imbens and Manski (2004)
confidence interval lower bound -0.120 -0.098 -0.087 -0.067 -0.036 -0.028 -0.002 0.027
95% Imbens and Manski (2004)
confidence interval upper bound 0.421 0.383 0.352 0.309 0.260 0.253 0.227 0.226
1.7 Conclusions
The methods derived in this paper offer researchers a formal and tractable way of assessing
the extent to which experimental results generalize to contexts outside the original study.
More broadly, this paper provides a first step away from seeing generalizability as an all-or-
nothing proposition. I empirically demonstrated the problems with testing for unobserved
differences across contexts among individuals with the same observed characteristics and
taking the test results as sanctioning or prohibiting extrapolation to a particular context. In
the Mexican microenterprise example, the test grants the researcher license to extrapolate
broadly based on a very small experiment. In the remedial education example, testing leads
us to conclude that the experimental results from one site teach us nothing about causal
effects in the other.
In contrast, the bounds developed here quantify our uncertainty about effects in the
context of interest due to unobserved differences across the contexts. In the Mexican mi-
croenterprise case, the narrow bounds showed us that the Leon 2006 results appear largely
representative of effects for similar entrepreneurs in urban Mexico in 2012. However, the
small size of the experiment should make us cautious about extrapolating, which shows up
in the wide confidence intervals around the bounds. In the remedial education example, the
bounds showed that under assumptions of strong dependence between a student’s grade-
level competency with and without a remedial education teacher assigned to her school,
we can learn quite a bit about about the effect of remedial education in one city using
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results from the other. The experimental effects in the two cities are consistent with the
assumption of strong dependence.
Since experimental sites must often be chosen for reasons of cost or convenience, the
methods proposed in this paper have broad applicability. In addition to assessing what can
be learned about causal effects in new contexts on the basis of existing experimental results,
they may be used when researchers have some leeway to select experimental sites. Based
on an assumed distribution for treated outcomes, a researcher could estimate prospective
bounds on causal effects in contexts of interest with different possible experimental sites15 .
15This procedure would be akin to the power calculations commonly undertaken in determining the nec-
essary sample size for an experiment, but for identification.
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1.8 Definition of copula
A copula function C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] satisfies:
1. Boundary conditions:
(a) C(0, v) = C(u, 0) = 0 ∀ u, v ∈ [0, 1]
(b) C(u, 1) = u and C(1, v) = v ∀ u, v ∈ [0, 1]
2. Monotonicity condition:
3. C(u, v) + C(u′, v′)− C(u, v′)− C(u′, v) ∀ u, v, u′, v′ s.t. u ≤ u′, v ≤ v′
1.9 Proof of equivalence of bounds in proposition 2 and linear program-
ming representation
Proof. By the definition of a copula, any C ∈ C defines a joint distribution FY0,Y1(y0, y1) =
C(FY0(y0), FY1(y1)) satisfying FY0,Y1(y0,∞) = F eY0(y0) and FY0,Y1(∞, y1) = F eY1(y1). This
is exactly what is required by constraints 1.14 and 1.15. The equivalence of the bounds in
Proposition 2 and the full linear programming representation follows immediately from the
definition of ρ(V,W ) and constraint 1.16.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of profits: McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) control group and 2012
ENAMIN
Note: distribution of profits in 2005 pesos for control firms in McKenzie and Woodruff
(2008) and the 2012 Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios, using the same sample selection
criteria as in McKenzie and Woodruff (2008). The distribution of profits is smoothed using
a kernel density estimator with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 750 pesos before
discretizing to 500 peso bins.
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Figure 1.5: Bounds on the average return to cash transfers in urban Mexico in 2012 using
experimental data from McKenzie and Woodruff (2008)
Note: For each lower bound on the dependence between profits with and without cash
transfers, ρL, the solid black region shows the bounds on the return to cash transfers in urban
Mexico in 2012 for microentrepreneurs selected according to the criteria in McKenzie and
Woodruff (2008), ATEa, derived from the experimental results in McKenzie and Woodruff
(2008). The translucent gray region is a Imbens and Manski (2004) 95% confidence interval
for ATEa, based on 100 bootstrap replications, clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 1.6: controls - grade level competency on exiting 3rd grade conditional on grade
level competency on entering 3rd grade
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Figure 1.7: Bounds on the change in average grade level competency in Vadodara using
experimental results from Mumbai and untreated outcomes from Vadodara
Note: For each lower bound on the dependence between a student’s maximum grade level
competency with and without a remedial education teacher assigned to her school, ρL, the
solid black region shows the bounds on the average gain in maximum grade level competency
in Vadodara, ATEa, derived from the experimental results in Mumbai. The translucent
gray region is a Imbens and Manski (2004) 95% confidence interval for ATEa, based on 100
bootstrap replications. The light gray line shows the point estimate of the actual average
gain in Vadodara, using the experimental results. The dashed line shows a 95% confidence
interval for the actual average gain.
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Figure 1.8: Bounds on change in average grade level competency in Mumbai using experi-
mental results from Vadodara and untreated outcomes from Mumbai
Note: For each lower bound on the dependence between a student’s maximum grade level
competency with and without a remedial education teacher assigned to her school, ρL, the
solid black region shows the bounds on the average gain in maximum grade level competency
in Mumbai, ATEa, derived from the experimental results in Vadodara. The translucent
gray region is a Imbens and Manski (2004) 95% confidence interval for ATEa, based on 100
bootstrap replications. The light gray line shows the point estimate of the actual average
gain in Mumbai, using the experimental results. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence
interval on the actual average gain.
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Chapter 2
Indian Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from
the Firm Size Distribution
2.1 Introduction
India’s labor and industrial regulations have been blamed for many of the country’s ills,
including low levels of aggregate productivity, slow growth of productivity, and lackluster
job creation in the formal sector1 (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Kochhar, Kumar, Rajan,
Subramanian, and Tokatlidis (2006); Besley and Burgess (2004); Hasan and Jandoc (2012)).
Of particular note is Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s landmark study, in which the authors
argue that aggregate total factor productivity in India could be 40%-60% higher if not for
significant misallocation of resources across firms. They go on to suggest that India’s labor
regulations may be to blame for the observed misallocation, although they leave the job of
fully corroborating this link to others. In fact, the view that labor regulations are of primary
importance is not universally held. Many argue that the laws as written are rarely enforced
so that, in practice, firms are effectively unconstrained.2 Others argue that the existing
evidence on the detrimental impact of labor regulations is flawed (Bhattacharjea (2006,
2009)). Still others point out that the vast majority of regulations have gone unstudied
while nearly all of the attention from economists and the press has focused on a single
regulation (Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act) - one that is not likely to constrain
any but the very largest firms (Bardhan (2014)).3
It is the goal of this paper to address the above aspects of this debate while avoiding
1Here and elsewhere in the paper, the formal sector refers to business enterprises that are registered with
some branch of the government.
2For instance, in a recent paper, Chaurey (2015) provides evidence that firms seem to hire contract
workers as a way of avoiding certain regulations.
3Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) stipulates that firms in the industrial sector with 100
or more workers must obtain permission from the relevant governmental authority before laying off workers.
Bardhan (2014) points out that 92 percent of firms in the garmet sector have less than 8 workers.
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some of the criticisms that have been leveled at previous work. In particular, we use a novel
methodology and a uniquely well-suited dataset to study the behavior of firms in response
to regulatory thresholds in order to determine whether and to what extent firms are in
fact constrained by regulations.4 We proceed in the following steps. First, we generate
the establishment-size distribution using data from the Economic Census of India (EC),
which, importantly, aims to be a complete enumeration of all non-farm business units,
regardless of size or status (formal or informal). From the distribution, we observe that
it closely follows a power law, except for a discontinous and proportional decrease in the
density of establishments with 10 or more workers. This is precisely the threshold at which
a multitude of regulations become legally binding, so we take this observation as evidence
that firms with 10 or more workers do seem to be constrained in size by certain regulations
- although these are not the same regulations that most others have focused on. We then
develop a model of firm size choice under regulatory thresholds which is based on Garicano,
Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2013) (henceforth GLV), but augmented to explicitly allow for
the possibiliy of misreporting.5 We model the regulations as causing an increase in the
unit labor costs of those firms that report having exceeded the 10 worker threshold6, and
then use the observed distortion in the size distribution to estimate these costs. Under our
primary estimation method at the All-India level, we find that firms behave as if operating
at or above the 10-worker threshold entailed a 35% increase in their per-worker costs.
Our next step is to document substantial heterogeneity in the size of our estimated costs
along several dimensions including state, industry and ownership type. For example, we
find that the state with the highest estimated regulatory costs is Bihar and that privately-
4Note: for expositional purposes we occasionally refer to “firms”, although it would be more correct
to refer to “factories” or “establishments”, since all of the data and most of the regulations are at the
factory/establishment level rather than the firm level. Regardless, the disinction is almost moot: nearly all
Indian firms are single factory/establishment firms.
5Misreporting was a lesser concern in GLV’s original setting, as they had access to administrative data.
In contrast, the data in the Economic Census are self-reported, which makes the threat of deliberate misre-
porting more significant in our case.
6This is the only way to generate a proportional decrease in the theoretical density, at least in a static
model.
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owned establishments have the highest costs, while government-owned establishments have
the lowest. Exploring this variation further, we find that our estimated costs turn out to be
correlated with some previous state-level measures of labor regulation reforms (in particular,
certain measures from Dougherty (2009)), though not with others (for example, the Besley-
Burgess measure from Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2008)).7 Moreover, we find
strong and robust correlations between our estimated costs and two quite distinct measures
of corruption8, even after controlling for a number of factors including state GDP per
capita. As further support for our state-level results, we show that industries with greater
“regulatory dependence” have higher estimated costs, but only when they are located in
more corrupt states.9 We take these correlations to be suggestive of the fact that the true
cost of the regulations may have more to do with bureacracy and corruption, rather than
the content of labor and industrial regulations themselves.
Finally, we turn to a brief discussion of the possible dynamic consequences of the costs we
estimate. We show that, while higher costs are associated with slower growth in employment
and productivity in the registered manufacturing sector, this association is more muted -
or even in the opposite direction - in the unregistered manufacturing sector, where the
regulations are less salient. This suggests that the costs we estimate may play a role in
the “informalization” of the Indian economy, by pushing workers from the formal to the
informal sector.
This paper aims to contribute to at least three important strands of literature. The first,
which we have already mentioned, is the literature on misallocation of resources and total
factor productivity (TFP), as exemplified by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Our contribution
7This may reflect the fact that the Besley-Burgess measures focus on the IDA, while the regulations we
study are entirely different. On the other hand, if the Besley-Burgess measures are meant to capture the
general effect of labor laws at the state level, one might expect the two measures to be correlated.
8These corruption measures include a subjective, perceptions-based measured of corruption from Trans-
parency International and a measure of the percentage of electricity that is lost in transmission and distribu-
tion as reported by the Reserve Bank of India (this latter measure has been used as a proxy for government
corruption and ineffectiveness in, for example, Kochhar et al, 2006).
9We measure “regulatory dependence” by taking the industry average of the number of inspector visits
among Indian firms in the 2005 World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
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is to provide direct evidence that at least some of the misallocation of resources across
firms in India is tied to regulations or the enforcement thereof.10 In particular, we show
that size-based regulations (or at least the ways in which they are enforced) lead firms to
fall short of their optimal scale, thus distorting the allocation of labor among firms in the
economy and, likely, lowering TFP.
Another strand of literature to which we aim to contribute relates to corruption in the
enforcement of government policies. Most previous studies (eg: Besley and McLaren (1993);
Mookherjee and Png (1995)) have modeled such corruption as collusion between inspectors
and firms or citizens: corrupt inspectors allow firms to avoid the de jure costs of abiding
by regulations in exchange for bribes. Hence, in these frameworks, corruption lowers the
costs associated with regulations. However, our results suggest that the costs associated
with size-based regulations are higher in more corrupt environments, and are thus more in
line with an alternative framework in which corruption takes the form of extortion between
inspectors and firms (i.e.: corrupt inspectors take advantage of bureacratic regulations in
order to extract higher rents from firms in the form of harassment bribes).11 We present
a theoretical model as well as anecdotal evidence from “ipaidabribe.com” to support this
interpretation and view the support we provide for this alternative conception of corruption
to be another contribution of the paper.
Lastly, this paper is also clearly related to the large literature that more generally in-
vestigates the impact of Indian labor regulations on economic outcomes. The literature
dates back to at least Fallon and Lucas (1993), but the more recent proliferation seems to
be due to the work of Besley and Burgess (2004). In that paper, the authors first interpret
state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) as either “pro-worker” or “pro-
employer” and then aim to show that Indian states that amended the IDA in a “pro-worker”
direction experienced slower growth in output, employment, investment and productivity
10In future work we hope to determine what portion of the TFP loss from misallocation estimated by
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) can be attributed to the regulations we study.
11This finding echoes Novosad and Asher (2014), in which it is argued that regulations can provide a
means through which politicians can impose costs on businesses.
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in registered manufacturing. The paper, though extremely influential, has been criticized
by Bhattacharjea (2006) and Bhattacharjea (2009) on a number of grounds. One of Bhat-
tacharjea’s major criticisms is that Besley and Burgess’s interpretations of amendments as
“pro” or “anti-worker” are subjective and debatable (ie: different people might read and
code them in a different way). This criticism affects most of the subsequent academic work
on this topic, since most papers use the Besley-Burgess codings, but it is a criticism we
are able to sidestep with our methodology. Since our analysis is based only on firm level
data and size-thresholds stated explicitly in the laws themselves, it has the advantage of
objectivity.
The second contribution we make to this literature is to focus on a set of regulations
that have been almost entirely ignored even though they effect a much larger proportion
of firms than Chapter VB of the IDA.12 The only other papers of which we are aware that
study regulations that kick in at the 10-worker threshold are Dougherty (2009), Dougherty,
Frisancho, and Krishna (2014) and Kanbur and Chatterjee (2013). The latter investigates
the Factories Act, which applies to all manufacturing firms that use power and have 10
or more workers (or don’t use power and have 20 or more workers), but their focus is to
document non-compliance under the act, which we see as complementary to our approach
of estimating the costs of the regulations.13 The papers by Dougherty and co-authors
employ state-level indices of labor reforms that differ from the Besley-Burgess codes in that
they include consideration of non-IDA regulations such as the Factories Act, but they are
constructed from surveys of industry experts and, as such, are by and large subject to
similar concerns regarding subjectivity.
Another way in which we distinguish ourselves from the previous literature on Indian
12Chapter VB of the IDA only applies to manufacturing firms with 100 or more workers. In contrast, the
regulations we study affect all firms with 10 or more workers and are thus relevant for a much larger share of
firms. We have also tried analyzing Chapter VB of the IDA using the same methodology we employ for the
regulations with the 10 worker threshold, but find no effects. I.e.: there does not seem to be a proportional
decrease in the density of establishments with more than 100 workers. We also fail to observe “bunching”
of firms at sizes just below 100, although the presence of rounding may make such bunching impossible to
discern even if it exists.
13Our estimated costs are robust to the possibility of noncompliance.
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regulations is that we explore the effect of regulations in all non-farm segments of the Indian
economy - not just in registered manufacturing, on which nearly all previous academic
studies have focused. A final contribution of the paper is to provide suggestive evidence
that improper government enforcement of regulations may play a role in shifting employment
from the registered to the unregistered sector.
In the next section (Section 2.2), we provide an overview of the relevant institutional
details regarding Indian labor and industrial regulations. Section 2.3 introduces the data
and covers some basics about the size distribution of enterprises in India. In Section 2.4 we
go over the theoretical model and our corresponding empirical strategy. Section 3.6 provides
the main results. In Section 2.6, we interpret the findings, explore the multiple dimensions
of variation in our results, and investigate the connection between our estimated costed and
corruption. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background: Size-Based Regulations in India
In this paper we attempt to investigate the effects of certain size-based industrial and labor
regulations in India. These are regulations that only apply to establishments that exceed
a certain size, measured either in terms of a firm’s revenue, the amount of fixed capital
invested, or the number of workers employed. One of the most significant such thresholds
occurs when establishments employ 10 or more workers, after which they must register
with the government and meet various workplace safety requirements (under the Factories
Act14, for example), pay social security taxes (under the Employees’ State Insurance Act),
distribute gratuities (under the Payment of Gratuity Act) and bear a greater administrative
burden (under, e.g., the Labor Laws Act).
Not only are the laws numerous, it has been argued that certain components of the laws
are antiquated and/or arbitrary. For example we read in the “India Labour Report” that
14Technically the Factories Act applies for 10-plus worker establishments only if they use power. For
establishments that do not use power, the Factories Act does not apply until they employ 20 workers.
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“Rules under the Factories Act, framed in 194815, provide for white washing of factories.
Distemper won’t do. Earthen pots filled with water are required. Water coolers won’t
suffice. Red-painted buckets filled with sand are required. Fire extinguishers won’t do...
And so on” TeamLease Services (2006). Firm owners who choose not to comply with such
regulations may face costs if discovered and convicted.16
In addition to - or in lieu of - the explicit costs of complying with the regulations,
establishments with 10 or more workers may be subject to implicit costs associated with
increased interaction with labor inspectors, et al, who may have the power to extract bribes
and tighten (or ease) the administrative burden firms face. Indeed, inspectors in India
have a large amount of discretion regarding the enforcement of administrative law. For
example, in some cases, the definition of what constitutes a “day” is at the discretion of the
inspector, and it is a commonly held view that “[w]hile grave violations are ignored, minor
errors become a scope for harassment” (TeamLease Services (2006)).
This kind of behaviour has been referred to as “harassment bribery” (Basu (2011)).
Anecdotal evidence of inspectors using the complexity and sheer amount of paperwork as
a way to extract bribes is easy to come by. For example, we have included a selection of
citizen reports from “ipaidabribe.com” in Appendix 2, which demonstrate just this kind of
behaviour.17 Interestingly, some of the reports suggest that the size of the bribe paid is a
direct linear function of the number of employees - which will be relevant to our estimation
procedure later.
As we alluded to earlier, the 10 worker threshold is not the only one relevant; there are
other cutoffs at which different regulations become binding. For example, the threshold
that seems to have received the most attention, both from academics and the press, is that
of 100 workers, at which enterprises in most states become subject to Chapter VB of the
Industrial Disputes Act, under which they must be granted government permission to lay
15The Factories Act itself dates to 1948, but the origins of the law go back another 100 years at least, to
Britain’s first Factory Acts.
16These costs may include fines and/or prison sentences.
17We thank Andrew Foster for this suggestion.
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off workers. There are other cutoffs still,18 but in this paper we will focus on estimating
some of the costs and effects associated with the regulations that come into force at the
10 worker cutoff. One important limitation of our analysis is that we will not be able to
address issues regarding the efficacy of any regulations in promoting worker welfare.
2.3 Data and the Size Distribution in India
2.3.1 Data
The data we rely on to investigate the 10-worker threshold comes from the Economic Census
(EC) of India. The EC is meant to be a complete enumeration of all (formal and informal)
non-farm business establishments19 in India at a given time, regardless of their size. It is this
last clause that makes the EC different from every other data source available and precisely
suited to our needs. Although the 2005 dataset contains a large number of observations
(almost 42 million), there is not very detailed information collected on each observation.
For each establishment in the data, there is only information on a handful of variables
including the total number of workers usually working, the number of non-hired workers
(such as family members working alongside the owner), the registration status, the 4-digit
NIC industry code, the type of ownership (private, government, etc) and the source of funds
for the establishment. There is no information on capital, output or profits, and the data
is cross-sectional.
The EC has rarely been used in academic papers - possibly because it is cross-sectional,
contains a significant amount of measurement error, and only contains information on the
handful of variables just enumerated, so that better data sources exist for most purposes.
18For example, firms with 20 or more workers must abide by the Provident Funds Act. Firms with 50 or
more workers must comply with Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, which requires them to provide
compensation and notice to employees prior to lay-offs.
19The EC refers to these as “entreprenuerial units” and defines them as any unit “engaged in the production
or distribution of goods or services other than for the sole purpose of own consumption.” As is common in
the literature, we occasionally refer to them as “firms” even though the unit of observation in the data is
actually a factory or an establishment, rather than a firm (i.e.: multiple establishments may belong to the
same firm). We do this for expositional purposes and justify our use of this convention with the observation
that the proportion of establishments that belong to multi-establishment firms is minute.
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The EC is ideal for our purpose, however, since it includes information on employment size
and covers the entire universe of establishments. Other more commonly used datasets, such
as the CMIE’s Prowess Database, the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) or the National
Sample Survey’s (NSS) Unorganized Manufacturing Surveys cover only certain parts of the
distribution and thus cannot be used for our purpose. The ASI, for example, only covers
factories in the manufacturing sector that have registered with the government under the
Factories Act. However, registration under this Act is only required for establishments with
10 or more workers if the unit uses power (20 or more workers if the factory uses no power).
Therefore, the selection of the ASI varies discontinuously at precisely the point of interest.
Similar limitations on coverage make the other datasets - other than the EC - unsuitable.
Aside from the Economic Census, we also supplement our analysis with data from a
variety of other sources. From the ASI we get employment and productivity in the registered
manufacturing sector. We generate those same variables for the unregistered sector with
data from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI) and the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). We get data on state and industry level corruption from a)
Transparency International’s “India Corruption Study 2005”, b) the RBI, and c) the World
Bank Enterprise Survey for India (2005). Data on State-level regulatory enforcement come
from the Indian Labour Year Book.20 Other measures of state-level regulations come from
Aghion et al. (2008) and Dougherty (2009), while industry-level measures of exposure to
trade liberalization come from Ahsan and Mitra (2014).
2.3.2 The Size Distribution of Establishments in India
Figure 2.1 below shows the distribution of establishments by the number of total work-
ers (hired and non-hired workers) for establishments with up to 200 total workers in 2005.
Perhaps the most striking feature of figure 2.1 is the extraordinary degree to which the distri-
bution is right-skewed. Indeed, about half of all establishments are single person enterprises,
20We would like to thank Anushree Sinha and Avantika Prabhakar for their considerable and generous
help in obtaining these data.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of establishment size for establishments with 1-200 total workers,
2005
while the densities for establishments with 10 or more workers are almost imperceptible.21
Figure 2.2 shows the drop in density for establishments with 10 or more workers in detail
and figure 2.3 shows the full distribution of establishment size frequencies according to a
log scale. Each point represents one bar in the earlier histograms.
Two things are most striking about figure 2.3. First, the natural log of the density is
a linear function of the natural log of the number of total workers. This implies that the
unlogged distribution follows an inverse power law in the number of total workers. This
pattern will be important for the analysis that follows but it is not very surprising in and of
itself: power law distributions in firm sizes have been documented in many countries (e.g.
Axtell (2001) and Herna´ndez-Pe´rez, Angulo-Brown, and Tun (2006)). The second and more
unique feature of the distribution is that there appears to be a level shift downward in the
log frequency for establishment sizes greater than or equal to 10. Figure 2.4 shows this
effect for establishments with fewer than 100 workers by running an OLS regression of the
log density against log firm size and allowing the intercept to vary for firms with 10 or more
21The densities for establishments with more than 200 workers are also imperceptible. We have omitted
them only for clarity in the figure.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of establishment size for establishments with 5-25 total workers,
2005
Figure 2.3: Distribution of establishment size, 2005, log scale
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Figure 2.4: Downward shift at the 10-worker threshold in the distribution of establishment
size, 2005, log scale (omitting establishments with more than 100 workers)
workers. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to document this phenomenon
in India.
Also of note from the figures above is that there appears to be a significant amount
of non-classical measurement error, seemingly due to rounding of establishment sizes to
multiples of 5 and 10. The existence of rounding is not surprising given that the data are
self-reported and that respondents are asked to give the “number of persons usually working
[over the last year]”. Partially to alleviate concerns that the non-classical measurement
error due to rounding might bias our results (and partially for other reasons to be made
explicit shortly), we will employ an estimation procedure which first smooths the data
non-parametrically.
2.4 Model and Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Basic Model
To interpret the downward shift from Figure 2.4 in economic terms, we turn to the model
in GLV. In their framework, size-based regulations are assumed to increase the unit labor
costs of firms that exceed the size threshold, which results in a downshift in part of the
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theoretical firm size distribution. From the magnitude of the downshift they observe in the
empirical distribution they attempt to estimate the additional labor costs imposed by the
regulations.
GLV begin with a distribution of managerial ability (α ∼ φ(α)) as the primitive object,
following Lucas (1978). As is common in the literature (e.g. Eaton, 2011), they assume
that the distribution of managerial ability follows a power law (e.g. φ(α) = cαα
−βα). It
is this that will generate a power law in the theoretical firm size distribution. A firm with
productivity or managerial ability α faces the following profit-maximization problem:
pi(α) = max
n
αf(n)− wτ¯n
where n is the number of workers a firm employs, f(n) is a production function (with
f ′(n) > 0 and f ′′(n) < 0), w is a constant wage paid to all workers, and τ¯ is a proportional
tax on labor that takes the value 1 if n ≤ N and τ if n > N , where τ > 1.
From the first order condition on this maximization problem, α = wτ
f ′ (n)
, one can see
that higher productivity establishments/managers will employ more workers, and that firms
which cross the threshold (N) and must therefore pay higher labor costs will hire fewer
workers than they would otherwise. This latter feature is built to match the observed
“downshift” in the actual firm size distribution to the right of the regulatory threshold.
One can informally characterize the solution as follows: one set of managers with partic-
ularly low productivity (below some threshold α1) will be effectively unconstrained. These
managers would have chosen to hire fewer than 10 workers whether or not the regulation was
present. Another set of managers with slightly higher productivity (between some thresh-
olds α1 and α2) would, in the absence of the regulation, have chosen to hire 10 or more
workers - but who, in the presence of the regulation, obtain higher profits by hiring only 9
workers to avoid the discontinuous increase in costs implied by crossing the threshold. These
mangers should be “bunched up” at 9. The last set of managers are those with high enough
productivity (α > α2) that it is not worth it to avoid the regulation and so they choose to
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exceed the threshold and pay the tax. However, these managers face higher marginal costs
than they would in the absence of the regulation and therefore employ fewer workers by a
constant proportion (resulting in a “downshift” in the logged firm size distribution).
An exact expression for the distribution of firm size, χ(n), can be recovered as a trans-
formation of the distribution of managerial ability, φ(α), since the first-order conditions on
the firms’ maximization problems imply a monotonic relationship between α and n. The
key result is that a function of the tax enters multiplicatively in the expression for the
density of firms size n (for all n > 9). Therefore, the function of the tax enters additively
in the log density for all firms large enough to be subject to the tax.
Formally, the density of firms with n total workers, χ(n) is given by:
χ(n) =

(
1−θ
θ
)1−β
(β − 1)n−β if n ∈ [nmin, N)(
1−θ
θ
)1−β
(N1−β − τ−β−11−θ n1−βu ) if n = N
0 if n ∈ (N,nu)(
1−θ
θ
)1−β
(β − 1)τ−β−11−θ n−β if n ≥ nu
where θ measures the degree of diminishing returns to scale, capturing both features of
the production function and market power, β represents the negative slope of the power law
and τ is the implicit per worker tax. Taking logs and combining the first and last cases22
leads to:
log(χ(n)) = log
[(
1− θ
θ
)1−β
(β − 1)
]
− β log(n) + log(τ−β−11−θ )1{n > 9}
This leads to an estimating equation:
log(χ(n)) = α− β log(n) + δ1{n > 9} (2.1)
22In other words, we ignore the bunching at N and the valley directly after, since these are features that
are not easily observable in the data. Instead we focus on the ranges n ∈ [nmin, N) and n > nu.
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We can identify τ according to:
τ = exp(δ)
− 1−θ
β−1
τ is thus a function of θ, β and δ. We get estimates for α, β and δ from equation 2.1.
Knowing α and β pins down θ, which allows us to identify τ .
2.4.2 Concerns Regarding Misreporting
Before proceeding further, we must consider how our results might be affected by the
possibility of misreporting. This is important because one of the underlying assumptions of
the analysis above is that the size distribution of firms as observed in the Economic Census
is accurate. However, since the data are self-reported, it is possible that plant managers
may misreport information to Economic Census enumerators. Specifically, if the managers
are aware of the increased regulatory burden that is associated with employing 10 or more
workers, and if they believe that the EC enumerators will relay information to government
regulatory bodies, they may wish to hide the fact that their actual employment exceeds the
threshold. To see how this type of behavior might affect our results, we model it explicitly
in the following subsection.
A further reason to be concerned about the possibility of misreporting is due to the
fact that Economic Census enumerators were required to fill out an extra form containing
the address of any establishment that reported 10 or more workers. It is conceivable that
enumerators might have found it preferable to under-report the number of workers for
establishments with 10 or more workers in order to avoid the extra burden of filling in the
“Address Slip”. Although we do not model this type of problem explicitly in what follows,
the implications are nearly identical to those of the model we do explicitly analyze.23
23The only difference is that higher fixed costs would replace higher marginal costs. It is, moreover, easy
to show that if our estimation strategy is robust to the model of misreporting we do analyze, it is also robust
to this second type of misreporting as well.
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2.4.3 A Theoretical Model of Misreporting
Our model of misreporting starts with the theoretical model from Section 2.4.1, and amends
it to allow firms to choose not only their true employment (n), but also their reported
employment (l). Then, a firm with productivity α faces the following profit-maximization
problem:
pi(α) = max
n,l
αf(n)− wn− τ l ∗ 1(l > 9)− F (n, l) ∗ p(n, l)
where α, f(n), w and τ are all defined as they were previously. The problem is identical
except that now firms pay the extra marginal cost, τ , only on their reported employment,
and not on their true employment. Furthermore, they only pay this cost if their reported
employment exceeds the threshold.24 There is now an incentive for firms to misreport their
employment in a downward direction (i.e.: to set l < n). Counteracting this incentive
is that misreporting firms may be caught by the authorities with probability p(n, l), and
made subject to a fine, F (n, l). As written above, both the probability of being caught
and the magnitude of the fine may in general depend on n and l in an arbitrary way.
However, if one is willing to make the assumption that the expected cost of misreporting
(F ∗ p) is an increasing and convex function of the degree of misreporting, n− l, it will be
possible to use an estimation technique that will be only minimally biased by the presence of
misreporting. Fortunately, based on our understanding of the context in which firms make
these decisions,25 we believe that this is the most reasonable assumption on the functional
form of the expected cost that one could make.
One plausible way to obtain convex misreporting costs is to suppose that firms are
caught with a probability that is linearly increasing in the degree of their misreporting (i.e.:
n − l) and subject to a fine if caught which is also a linear function of their misreporting.
24In point of fact it is most likely that firms’ answers to Economic Census enumerators have no impact
on their regulatory burden, but it is possible that firms believe otherwise, and that is what is relevant.
25This understanding is informed by informal interviews with small businesses in Chennai and our reading
of the secondary literature.
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Another possibility is that the probability of being caught is itself an increasing and convex
function of the degree of misreporting and the fine if caught is fixed. In what follows we will
assume the latter for clarity of exposition, but the analysis is identical for any assumption
that yields convex costs of misreporting.
Specifically, suppose that misreporting firms are caught with probability p(n, l) = (n−l)
2
100 ,
and pay a fixed fine, F , if caught. Then their profit maximization problem is:
pi(α) = max
n,l
αf(n)− wn− τ l ∗ 1(l > 9)− F ∗ (n− l)
2
100
The solution to this problem can be informally characterized as follows. The lowest
productivity firms (those with α below some threshold, α1) will be unconstrained, choosing
n ≤ 9 and reporting truthfully (l = n). Higher productivity firms, with α ∈ [α1, α2], will
choose n > 9, exceeding the regulatory threshold, but will find it profitable to misreport
their employment, setting l = 9. These firms will only appear to be “bunched” up at 9,
but will in fact have higher employment. The last category of firms are those with α > α2,
which are productive enough to warrant hiring work forces so large that they cannot avoid
detection with reasonable probability and must report l > 9. Even these firms, however,
with both n > 9 and l > 9 do not find it profit-maximizing to report truthfully. They
can save on their unit labor costs by shading their reported employment, and will choose
l = n − 50F τ . Note that the degree of misreporting is by a constant amount, rather than a
constant proportion.26
More formally, the log of the density of firms with true employment n, logχ(n), is given
by:
logχ(n) =

logA− βlog(n) if n ∈ [nmin, 9)
log[ξ(n)] if n ∈ [9, nm(α2)]
0 if n ∈ (nm(α2), nt(α2))
logA′(τ)− βlog(n) if n ≥ nt(α2)
26This outcome is a result of the convex cost assumption.
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while the log of the density of firms with reported employment l, logψ(l) is given by:
logψ(l) =

logA− βlog(l) if l ∈ [lmin, 9)
log(δl) if l = 9
0 if n ∈ (9, lt(α2))
logA′(τ)− βlog(l + 50F τ) if l ≥ lt(α2)
where terms have been simplified and collected.27 Both of these densities are graphically
represented in Figure 2.5 under specific values of the parameters (the true distribution, χ(n),
is represented by a thick line, and the reported distribution, ψ(l), is in blue). The key things
to note are the following. First, for the range l ≤ 9, the true distribution coincides with the
reported/observed distribution. Second, there appears to be bunching at 9 in the reported
distribution, but these firms in fact have greater than 9 workers. Third, compared to the
distribution for n < 9, the true distribution and the reported distribution for n  10 are
downshifted (A′(τ) < A), just as was the case in the model without misreporting.28 Fourth
- and most significantly - the reported distribution converges to the true distribution for
large l: lim
l→∞
βlog(l + 50F τ) − βlog(l) → 0. This is due to the fact that the misreporting is
by a constant amount (as noted earlier), rather than by a constant proportion.
To conclude this subsection on the theoretical implications of allowing for misreporting,
we make two observations. First, misreporting may lead us to observe “bunching” in the
firm size distribution when in reality there may be none. This is irrelevant for us since
our estimation strategy does not rely on the bunching in any way. Second, misreporting
may lead the reported/observed distribution to understate the true distribution close to the
cutoff. However, because the reported distribution converges to the true distribution for
large l/n, misreporting is not able to induce a downshift in the reported distribution that
differs from the downshift in the true distribution at large values of l. Therefore, if we use
an estimation strategy that focuses mostly on values far from the cutoff, our estimate of
the downshift using the observed distribution is likely to reflect the real downshift and thus
27Derivation to be added in an appendix.
28As before, the downshift is a function of τ .
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Figure 2.5: Theoretical Model of Misreporting, log scale (thick line = true distribution; thin
line = reported distribution; dashed line = counterfactual distribution)
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we are likely to avoid this source of bias. We develop such an estimation strategy in the
following subsection.
Before proceeding, however, we should note again that the above analysis assumes that
the expected costs of misreporting are strictly convex. There exist non-convex functional
forms of the cost function which may lead one to observe a downshift in the reported
distribution that is greater than the one in the true distribution, thus biasing any estimates
of τ upwards.
2.4.4 An Empirical Strategy Robust to the Possibility of Misreporting
Since convex misreporting costs imply that misreporting will only distort the distribution
of reported establishment size versus the true distribution of establishment size close to
the cutoff, we estimate the model on the full distribution of establishment size. Since
estimating equation 2.1 treats each establishment size as one observation, using the full
distribution of establishment size will mean that the model is primarily estimated using data
far from the 10-worker cutoff.29 However, estimating equation 2.1 on the full distribution of
establishment size introduces two complications. First, we cannot perform the estimation
on the empirical PMF for large firm sizes, since the empirical probability mass is truncated
29The largest establishment in the 2005 EC has 22,901 workers.
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at the reciprocal of the number of observations (see figure 2.6 below), while the underlying
density continues to diminish in establishment size. Second, respondents appear to round
their reported number of workers to the nearest multiple of 5 (see figure 2.2), a phenomenon
that is more pronounced for larger establishments and that could bias our results.
Figure 2.6: Downward shift at the 10-worker threshold in the distribution of establishment
size estimated on nonparametric density estimates, 2005, log scale (including all establish-
ments). Black points = actual data; Grey = smoothed data.
To address these two problems, we first estimate the density associated with each number
of workers χ(n) non-parametrically using the method of Markovitch and Krieger (2000),
which addresses the econometric issues arising in nonparametric density estimation of heavy-
tailed data. We then use the nonparametric density estimates as a basis for fitting the
model in equation 2.1, augmented by dummy variables for having 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10 - 20
workers.30 Figure 2.6 depicts the strategy. The black dots show the raw data. The grey
30The rationale for flexibly modeling the density at 1 and 2 workers is that own account enterprises and 2-
worker enterprises are likely to be household enterprises and may therefore differ fundamentally in character
from their larger counterparts. The rationale for flexibly modeling the density at 8 and 9 workers is that
the theory above predicts that the reported density just below the cutoff will be biased upwards by any
misreporting effects. Similarly, the theory also predicts that values above - but close to - the threshold may
also be biased (downwards). Therefore we also flexibly control for such values (10 to 20) as well, although
doing so has only a very small effect on the estimates: as explained above, the estimates are driven mostly
by observations relatively far from the threshold.
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dots represent the result of the first step: nonparametric density estimates associated with
each establishment size. The line shows the fit of the model in equation 2.1, augmented by
the dummy variables, to the nonparametric density estimates.
Figure 2.6 above provides some evidence for the model described in section 2.4.3. The
observed establishment size distribution appears to converge back to a power law with the
same slope as for establishments with fewer than 10 workers, but deviates slightly from that
slope at sizes just above the 10-worker cutoff. In the next section we report the results of
the estimation.
2.5 Preliminary Results
In this section we apply the estimation procedure described above to the 2005 Economic
Census of India and report the results. Standard errors obtained from a wild cluster boot-
strap procedure with 200 replications are given in parentheses.31 In the tables below, we
first report estimates for τ − 1 at the All-India level and for a selection of States, Industries
and Ownership Types. Estimates for all States, Industries and Ownership Types are re-
ported in the Appendix. The All-India estimate on τ−1 is .35 and is statistically significant.
This means that, on average, establishments in India that hire more than 9 workers act as
though they must pay additional labor costs of 35% of the wage per additional worker. In
the tables and figures it can be seen that there is substantial variation in the magnitude of
our estimates of the per-worker tax by State, Industry and Ownership Type. For example,
the point estimate on τ − 1 for the State of Kerala is .14, while the estimate for Bihar, on
the other hand, is .70, implying that establishments in Bihar act as though they must pay
a tax of 70% of the wage for each additional worker they hire past 9 workers.
We also observe substantial differences in the size of τ by industry: it appears that the
effective tax is highest for establishments in construction and retail. As one might expect,
the tax is nonexistent for establishments in the public administration sector (in fact it is
31We cluster at the firm size level to allow for the possibility that reporting errors may be correlated by
firm size.
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negative, but this seems to result from the fact that the assumed power law does not fit the
distribution of establishments in this sector well). Similarly, when looking at the differences
by ownership type, we find that the estimates for τ are highest for private firms (especially
unincorporated proprietorships), and nonexistent (or negative) for government-owned firms,
where presumably the regulatory burden is less than in the private sector.
Estimates of τ by State Using the Full Distribution of Establishment Size
Level τ − 1
All-India
.347
(0.059)
By State
Bihar .693
(0.069)
Gujarat 0.165
(0.047)
Kerala 0.138
(0.033)
Uttar Pradesh 0.502
(0.069)
By Industry
Construction .478
(0.047)
Manufacturing .268
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(0.039)
Wholesale, retail .637
(0.115)
Public admin., social security -.311
(0.031)
By Ownership Type
Government and PSU -.092
(0.028)
Unincorporated Proprietary .490
(0.005)
2.6 Discussion and Investigation of Mechanisms
2.6.1 Interpretation of Results
Thus far we have argued that the observed downshift in the distribution of establishments
with 10 or more workers is related to the existence of certain labor and industrial regulations
that become binding at that point. But if the regulations are responsible for the observed
effect, then differences in the substance or application of the regulations should explain (at
least part of) the great variation we observe across States and Industries.32 In this section
we explore these dimensions of variation with the goal of reaching a deeper understanding
32The variation across ownership types is straightforward to explain: the regulations are clearly not applied
in the same way to privately owned enterprises and government enterprises. An additional explanation is
that government establishments are not profit maximizing and thus would require a different motivational
theory altogether to produce the observed power law distribution.
78
regarding the causes and consequences of the costs we have tried to estimate. The regressions
we do are cross-sectional and the variables used are endogenous, so the results cannot be
given a causal interpretation, but we find them instructive nevertheless.
To preview our results, we do observe a correlation between our estimated costs (τ)
and certain measures of the substance of the regulations. Moreover, we also find a robust
and independent correlation between our estimated costs and several different measures of
corruption/poor state governance, suggesting that it is not only the regulations themselves
but also their enforcement and application that is responsible for the high costs we estimate.
We also sketch a theoretical framework of bribery and extortion which casts light on the
proper interpretation of our empirical results. Finally, we present some suggestive evidence
that our costs may have significant negative dynamic implications, as they are associated
with lower growth in employment and productivity in registered manufacturing - and higher
growth in employment in unregistered manufacturing.
2.6.2 τ and Corruption: Evidence from the Interstate Variation
We start by regressing our state-level estimates of τ against other established measures of
the regulatory environment (see Table 2.2).33 These measures include the “Besley Burgess”
(BB) measure of labor regulations from Aghion et al. (2008) and several measures from
Dougherty (2009). The first is a measure of the number of amendments that a state
government has made to the Industrial Disputes Act in either a “pro-worker” or “pro-
employer” direction, as interpreted by Aghion et al. (2008), who update the measure to
include amendments up to 1997.34 Positive values indicate more “pro-worker” amend-
ments, which are assumed to imply a more restrictive environment for firms operating in
those states. Dougherty (2009) also provides state level measures that reflect “the extent
to which procedural or administrative changes have reduced transaction costs in relation
33Note that the estimates of τ we use in all the analysis below were generated using the procedure in
Section 2.4.4 that we have argued is robust to possible misreporting and non-classical measurement error.
34Since there have been few state-level amendments to the IDA between 1997 and 2005, this measure
should be largely the same in 2005.
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to labor issues” Dougherty et al. (2014). Higher values therefore indicate an improved en-
vironment for firms. Dougherty’s measures are unique in that they cover a wide range of
labor-related issues - not just the IDA. In the analysis below, we will focus on measures
from Dougherty (2009) that cover reforms regarding 1) the Factories Act and 2) an overall
measure of reforms. All relevant variables in our analysis have been rescaled to have mean
zero and standard deviation one, with the goal of allowing comparability between regression
coefficients in different specifications.
In Table 2.2, correlations are reported between τ and the three measures both by them-
selves and while controlling for other factors (notably state GDP per capita and the state’s
share of employment in manufacturing). The Besley Burgess (BB) measure does not seem
to be correlated with τ (although our power is limited by the very small number of obser-
vations) while the two measures from Dougherty (2009) are significantly correlated after
applying controls (though not all the correlations are strongly significant) and have the
“correct” sign: states that saw more “transaction cost reducing” reforms have lower τs. 35
On the one hand the lack of correlation between τ and the BB measure is not surprising, as
the latter capture variation only due to state amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act,
which does not vary over the ten person threshold. On the other hand, if the Besley Burgess
measure is meant to capture the general regulatory environment (which is how it is used
in countless studies), we might well expect it to correlate with our measure of regulatory
costs. That the correlation does not hold may therefore be of interest.
While the prediction regarding the correlation between τ and BB 97 may be ambiguous,
that is not the case for Dougherty’s measures of transaction-cost reducing reforms related
to the Factories Act. We should expect our measure of τ to correlate negatively with the
latter, since the Factories Act does vary across the 10 worker threshold, and indeed we see
that it does. τ is also correlated with Dougherty’s more comprehensive measure of reforms,
one which aggregates reforms across all areas, although it does not appear to correlate with
35In this and most of the analysis ahead, we focus on the 18 largest Indian States, for which data are most
consistently available and which offer the most precise estimates of τ (the power law relationship breaks
down in smaller states when there are not enough observations).
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any other subcomponents (which are not depicted here).
Table 2.2: Tau vs Other Measures of Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau
Besley-Burgess -0.0734 -0.00841 0.0481
measure (regs) (0.204) (0.192) (0.172)
Dougherty measure -0.289 -0.407∗∗ -0.408∗
(all reforms) (0.201) (0.174) (0.198)
Dougherty measure -0.211 -0.318∗ -0.304
(FA reforms) (0.187) (0.166) (0.181)
log of net state -0.432∗ -0.592∗∗ -0.604∗∗ -0.575∗∗ -0.590∗∗ -0.605∗∗
domestic product pc (0.226) (0.214) (0.206) (0.241) (0.217) (0.257)
share of employment -3.490 2.657 3.899 2.962 3.486 4.215
in manufacturing (4.886) (5.090) (3.281) (4.934) (3.435) (5.163)
share of privately -11.66 2.003 0.529
owned establishments (6.768) (5.895) (6.221)
share of registered 3.042∗ -0.0440 0.654
establishments (1.530) (1.476) (1.469)
Constant 0.641∗∗∗ 5.315∗∗ 15.79∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 6.207∗∗∗ 4.259 0.631∗∗∗ 6.091∗∗ 5.481
(0.204) (2.165) (6.707) (0.187) (1.962) (6.113) (0.189) (2.068) (6.517)
Observations 15 15 15 18 18 18 18 18 18
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
Only including Major Indian States
In addition to the above measures regarding state-level changes to the statutory, proce-
dural and administrative aspects of the regulations, we also regress τ against certain other
measures of the labor environment. Table 2.3 reports the results of τ regressed against per
capita measures of strikes, man-days lost to strikes, lockouts and man-days lost to lockouts.
One might imagine that strikes and lockouts capture relevant features of the regulatory and
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labor environment,36 but we do not find them to be robustly correlated with τ .
One might also expect τ to be correlated with aspects of the regulatory enforcement.
To test this hypothesis we regress τ against state level variables related to enforcement
such as the number of inspections, convictions, and fines levied under various regulations.37
The results of the regressions for a subset of the enforcement related variables are shown in
Table 2.4. In short, the only enforcement variable that is even close to being significantly
correlated with τ is the percentage of factories registered under the Factories Act that have
been inspected. However, as can be seen from the table, the enforcement data are only
available for a small subset of the major states, leaving very little power in the regressions.
Furthermore, the regressions shown exclude Uttar Pradesh, which is a substantial outlier
in the enforcement data.
36For example, some industrial regulations explicitly undermine or support the rights of parties to engage
in strikes or lockouts.
37These data were obtained from the 2005 Indian Labour Yearbook, which we were able to attain with
the generous help of Anushree Sinha and Avantika Prabhakar of NCAER.
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Table 2.3: Tau vs Strikes and Lockouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau
strikes per capita -0.272∗ -0.196
(0.145) (0.148)
mandays lost due to -0.119 -0.148
strikes per capita (0.157) (0.159)
lockouts per capita -0.0544 -0.0915
(0.146) (0.143)
mandays lost due to -0.0527 -0.0995
lockouts per capita (0.145) (0.139)
log of net state -0.400 -0.493∗ -0.506∗∗ -0.515∗∗
domestic product pc (0.234) (0.238) (0.235) (0.235)
share of employment 2.548 4.482 3.831 3.754
in manufacturing (3.644) (4.171) (3.995) (3.913)
Constant 0.721∗∗∗ 4.352∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 5.017∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 5.191∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 5.291∗∗
(0.187) (2.204) (0.212) (2.272) (0.198) (2.221) (0.197) (2.222)
Observations 18 18 17 17 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
Only including Major Indian States
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Tau vs Enforcement of Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tau tau tau tau tau tau tau tau
percent of factories 0.448∗
inspected (0.230)
convictions under FA -0.0914
per factory (0.411)
prosecutions under -0.122
SEA per capita (0.357)
fines under SEA per 0.323
capita (0.342)
prosecutions per -0.134
inspection (0.254)
fines per inspection 2.598
under SEA (3.557)
cases disposed per -9.616
inspection under SEA (16.45)
cases disposed per 1.058
cases prosecuted under SEA (1.094)
log of net state -0.0180 -0.648 -1.545∗∗ -2.220∗∗ -1.572∗∗ -1.977∗∗ -1.471∗∗ -1.610∗∗
domestic product pc (0.921) (1.265) (0.606) (0.783) (0.537) (0.677) (0.600) (0.500)
share of employment -2.361 4.091 4.873 5.550 4.525 7.130 4.486 2.514
in manufacturing (7.120) (12.61) (4.855) (4.542) (4.883) (5.277) (4.848) (5.340)
Constant 0.970 6.706 15.42∗∗ 22.20∗∗ 15.72∗∗ 20.08∗∗ 12.60 16.57∗∗∗
(8.791) (11.88) (5.835) (7.767) (5.150) (6.986) (8.218) (4.802)
Observations 10 9 13 13 13 13 13 13
Standard errors in parentheses
Only including Major Indian States (except UP) for which data exist.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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To briefly summarize the results so far, when regressing τ against regulatory substance,
enforcement or industrial disputes, one only observes correlations for certain specific types
of measures of those phenomena. In contrast, in our remaining analysis, we will demon-
strate that our measures of τ are strongly and robustly correlated with corruption, almost
regardless of how it is measured. Table 2.5 reports the results of regressing τ against corrup-
tion as measured in a 2005 Transparency International (TI) Survey.38 Column 1 includes
all states for which there is data, while the remaining columns include only the 18 largest
Indian states. Column 3 adds controls for state GDP per capita, share of manufacturing in
employment and some others, while Column 4 adds the aggregate measure of regulatory re-
form from Dougherty (2009). With no exceptions, the coefficient on the TI corruption score
is consistently significant and very large in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase
in a state’s corruption score is associated with a .5 standard deviation increase in τ . In
particular, the fact that the coefficient remains significant in Column 4 even after control-
ling for Dougherty’s measure of regulatory reforms suggests that the relationship between
τ and corruption is at least partly independent from the relationship with the regulations
themselves.
In what follows we will use the TI corruption score as our primary measure of corruption.
One might be concerned, however, that the TI measure may be flawed as it is the result
of individuals’ perceptions (it has been argued by some that the perception of corruption
is an unreliable indicator for actual corruption). Therefore, we also regress τ against an
alternative measure of corruption that is not perception based to check for robustness of the
relationship between τ and corruption: Table 2.6 reports the results of τ regressed against
the percent of a state’s available electricity that was lost in transmission and distribution
in 2005. This variable has been used by other researchers as a proxy for corruption and
poor state governance, and has the virtue of being a concrete and objective measure that
does not depend on perceptions Kochhar et al. (2006). As with the TI Corruption Score,
38The TI corruption measure is based on a survey of perceptions and experience regarding corruption in
the public sector.
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the correlations between τ and this alternative measure of corruption are significant and
large in magnitude regardless of sample or controls - including, again, the addition of the
Dougherty measure of regulatory reform in Column 4. To make sure that the results are not
driven by the actual transmission of electricity, we control for per capita electricity available
in Column 5 - which does not affect the results.
Table 2.5: Tau vs Transparency International Corruption Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tau tau tau tau
TI Corruption Score 0.422∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.145) (0.153) (0.139)
log of net state -0.381∗ -0.446∗∗
domestic product pc (0.191) (0.172)
share of employment 7.362∗ 6.444∗
in manufacturing (4.007) (3.569)
share of privately -2.662 -2.057
owned establishments (4.805) (4.258)
share of registered 1.455 0.665
establishments (1.106) (1.048)
Dougherty measure -0.296∗
(all reforms) (0.142)
Constant 0.557∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 5.494 5.976
(0.153) (0.138) (4.847) (4.291)
Observations 20 18 18 18
States Included All Major Major Major
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.6: Tau vs Transmission and Distribution Losses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tau tau tau tau tau
electricity 0.318∗ 0.648∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.708∗∗
transmission and distribution losses (0.165) (0.244) (0.253) (0.237) (0.268)
log of net state -0.477∗ -0.536∗∗ -0.459∗
domestic product pc (0.222) (0.205) (0.229)
share of employment 7.651 6.515 6.817
in manufacturing (4.812) (4.439) (5.094)
share of privately -2.148 -1.440 -1.980
owned establishments (5.677) (5.200) (5.824)
share of registered 1.513 0.644 1.577
establishments (1.307) (1.284) (1.343)
Dougherty measure -0.317∗
(all reforms) (0.172)
Electricity 0.119
available (GWH) (0.182)
Constant -8.42e-09 0.643∗∗∗ 5.936 6.322 5.610
(0.163) (0.163) (5.746) (5.253) (5.910)
Observations 35 18 18 18 18
States Included All Major Major Major Major
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses
Although the state-level correlations between τ and corruption appear to be robust, the
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regressions lack exogenous variation and are subject to the concern that our measures of
corruption may be correlated with omitted variables that are also correlated with τ . To
partially address these concerns, we attempt to take advantage of State X Industry level
heterogeneity. In particular, inspired by Novosad and Asher (2014), we use 2005 World
Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data to create an industry-level measure of “dependence
on government bureaucracy”. Specifically, Indian firms in the 2005 WBES were asked how
many times in a year they had an inspection or other required meeting with a government
official. Averaging the firm-level responses by industry, we classify industries according to
their average number of visits with officials (i.e., their dependence on government bureau-
cracy). If some industries have more meetings with officials, and if corruption takes place
during some of these meetings, we would imagine that the costs of corruption would be
highest for firms in those industries with the highest dependence on bureaucracy and in
those states that have the highest levels of corruption. That is, we would expect that the
interaction between industry level dependence on bureaucracy and state level corruption is
positive. If found to be the case, it would be harder to argue that the result is due to the
presence of omitted variables.
The hypothesis is tested in Table 2.7. To do so we generate our measures of τ at the
State X Industry level39 and interact each of our state level measures of corruption with a)
the industry average number of visits from officials and b) the industry average duration of
visits from officials. We include the interaction with average duration of visits as a placebo
test: it is not clear that the duration of an inspection should be positively or negatively
correlated with corruption.40 We then regress our State X Industry measures of τ against
the covariates including interaction terms. Our prior is that the interaction of corruption
with duration of visits should be less significant than the interaction with number of visits.
39Industries here are categorized according to their groupings in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys,
which distinguishes 24 distinct industry categories. Examples include “auto components”, “leather and
leather products”, and “food processing”.
40In particular, corruption may lead to longer inspections if the process of extracting the bribe takes time,
or it may lead to shorter inspections if corruption obviates the need to carry out the actual inspection.
88
Indeed, this is mostly what we observe. The interaction between our measures of corruption
and the number of visits is at least weakly significant (at the 10% level) for one of the two
measures, while the interaction between corruption and average duration of visits is never
significant.
To summarize our results from these investigations, we find:
1. a correlation between τ and certain aspects of the substance of regulations as measured
in Dougherty (2009),
2. a nonexistent or inconclusive relationship between τ and measures of the labor envi-
ronment and enforcement of regulations, and
3. a strong and robust relationship between τ and two distinct measures of corruption.
Although none of these results can be said to be causal, we find them suggestive of a
relationship between corruption and high labor costs. Next, we turn our attention to the
question of how and why greater corruption would lead to higher labor costs for firms. To
this end, in the following subsection we outline a simple theoretical framework to elucidate
the potential connection.
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Table 2.7: Tau vs. State Level Corruption Interacted with Industry Level “Dependence  
on Regulation” (with Industry FEs) 
 
 
(1) 
tau 
(2) 
tau 
(3) 
tau 
(4) 
tau 
2005 TI Corruption Score 0.132* (0.0668) 
0.140* 
(0.0666)   
electricity transmission and distribution 
losses   
0.0583 
(0.114) 
0.0493 
(0.110) 
number of inspections 0.127 (0.0829) 
0.130 
(0.0945)   
duration of inspections  -0.00610 (0.124)  
-0.109 
(0.143) 
corruption score X num inspections 0.101* (0.0545)    
corruption score X duration of 
inspections  
0.0513 
(0.0691)   
electricity TDLs X num of inspections   0.0112 (0.0848)  
electricity TDLs X duration of 
inspections    
-0.0698 
(0.107) 
log of Net State Domestic Product pc -0.185***  (0.0364) 
-0.185*** 
(0.0374) 
-0.197***  
(0.0428) 
-0.194***  
(0.0427) 
Constant -0.244  (0.187) 
0.0235  
(0.442) 
-0.235  
(0.187) 
-0.217  
(0.498) 
Observations 189 189 189 189 
     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Standard errors clustered at the State Level, Industry FEs 
included	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A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Corruption Between Inspectors
and Firms
We find it helpful to distinguish between two types of corruption that could take place
between inspectors and firms: collusion and extortion. Collusion takes place when inspectors
allow firms to avoid the costs of complying with regulations in exchange for bribes. However,
poor state governance (which here would imply an inability to control corruption) would
then lead to lower costs for firms, as greater corruption would make it easier to avoid the
full costs of regulation.41 However, what we observed in Section 2.6.2 was a robust positive
correlation between effective costs (τ) and poor governance/corruption. To explain this
phenomenon, we need a model of extortion. In this section, we will sketch the intuition
for such a model. A fuller (but still simple) model of extortion and bribery is provided in
Appendix 3.
Let us start with the observation that all firms reporting at least 10 employees fall under
the jurisdiction of certain regulations. Imagine, now, that the regulations are so complex
so as to make it impossible (or prohibitively costly) for any firm to be fully in compliance
with all aspects of the law as written.42 Then, an inspector can, at any time, choose to
subject a firm under his jurisdiction to a penalty e, which may include financial (e.g.: fines)
and/or non-financial elements (e.g.: harassment, time needed to defend claims of violations,
etc). We can think of the extent of the penalty (e) as a function of state governance: prop-
erly functioning governments hire and motivate inspectors to pursue substantive violations
rather than minor ones, while inspectors in corrupt or dysfunctional governments can get
away with threatening to impose high penalties for even minor technical violations if a bribe
41See, for example, a model of corruption such as the one in Khan, Khwaja, and Olken (2014).
42This does not not require much imagination. As we mentioned in Section 2.2, many of the laws have
components that are antiquated, arbitrary, contradictory and confusing. That the laws may be impossible
to fully comply with is suggested by some of the anecdotes we provide in Appendix 2 as well as the following
observation, which we re-quote: “Rules under the Factories Act, framed in 1948, provide for white washing
of factories. Distemper won’t do. Earthen pots filled with water are required. Water coolers won’t suffice.
Red-painted buckets filled with sand are required. Fire extinguishers won’t do... And so on” (TeamLease
Services, 2006).
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is not paid (i.e.: extortion).
In such an environment, firms reporting 10 or more employees (and hence under the
jurisdiction of the inspector) may face a choice between exposing themselves to the penalty,
e, or paying a bribe, b. Assume that inspectors face no costs or benefits from imposing the
penalty on the firm, but naturally benefit from receiving the bribe. There is thus a surplus
to be had from paying/receiving the bribe b and avoiding the penalty. If the inspector
and firm Nash Bargain over the surplus with bargaining weights α and β, respectively, the
problem is the following:
max
b
(b)α(e− b)β
The solution is for the firm to pay a bribe b = αα+β ∗ e. The cost born by the firm is
therefore increasing in α, the bargaining weight of the inspector, and in e, the maximum
penalty to which the firm can be subjected. It is reasonable to imagine that this maximum
level of extortion, e, is roughly proportional to the size of the firm, so that e = e′ ∗n, where
n is the number of workers in the firm and e′ is the per worker level of extortion. In that
case the bribe per worker, bn , is equal to
α
α+β ∗ e′.43
This framework can be embedded into the firm’s choice of true and reported employment
as modeled in Section 2.4.3. In particular, the firm now faces a choice between reporting
employment greater than or less than 10, where reporting less than 10 allows it to avoid
the costs of bribery, and reporting greater than 10 exposes it to the bribery costs. In that
framework, τ corresponds to bn , and is therefore increasing in the bargaining power of the
inspector (α) and the corruption level of the state (e′). In this way, we can make sense of
the empirical results above in terms of this basic framework. Again, a more fully fleshed
out model that explicitly incorporates features missing here (such as an appeals process and
inspector types) is provided in Appendix 3.
43Again, we provide some support for the claim that bribes are proportional to the number of workers
with anecdotal evidence from ipaidabribe.com in Appendix 2.
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2.6.3 Possible Consequences of τ
In the subsections above, we tried to argue that our estimated costs (τ) are most likely
due, not only to the substance of the regulations themselves, but also to high levels of
corruption. In this subsection we will indicate possible consequences of high values of τ .
Again, the results cannot be given a causal interpretation, but we find them compelling
nevertheless. In what follows we use two distinct measures of τ : one which is created using
all the enterprises in a state, regardless of economic sector (τ) and another which is created
using only the enterprises engaged in manufacturing (τmanuf ).
Table 2.8 displays the results of employment growth in the manufacturing sector be-
tween 2010 and 2005 at the State Level regressed against our two measures of labor market
distortions (τ and τmanuf ) as well competing measures (BB and Dougherty). For each of
the four measures, we observe its performance as a predictor of future employment growth
in registered manufacturing as well as its correlation with employment growth in unregis-
tered manufacturing. Interestingly, in the regressions of employment growth in registered
manufacturing against τ and τmanuf , the coefficient on τ is negative and at least weakly
significant, while the coefficient for employment growth in unregistered manufacturing is
positive - significantly so in the case of τmanuf . This result makes sense: we should expect
higher costs to negatively effect the sectors to which the costs apply - in this case the regis-
tered sector, since that is under the ambit of labor regulations while the unregistered sector
is not. If these correlations reflect a causal chain, it would mean that high levels of regulator
costs and corruption (as measured by τ) are pushing employment from the registered to the
unregistered sector.
Also included in Table 2.8 are the results of employment growth in manufacturing re-
gressed against the BB and Dougherty measures. Neither regressor has a coefficient that
is statistically significant or of a meaningful magnitude.44 Putting aside the considerable
44One might argue that it is not quite fair to regress growth between 2010 and 2005 on a regressor that
uses data only up until 1997 (as is the case for the BB measure). However, a) we have duplicated these
results using from growth from 1997 to 2002 and the results are the same, and b) the Besley Burgess measure
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caveat that none of these results has the virtue of exogenous variation, it would appear to be
the case that our measures of labor market distortions do a better job of predicting future
employment growth (or the lack thereof) than the established alternatives. This is also true
when considering future growth in manufacturing productivity rather than employment, as
shown in Table 2.9. Higher levels of τ are associated with slower growth of productivity in
the registered manufacturing sector (less so in the unregistered sector)
Table 2.8: Manufacturing Employment Growth (2005 - 2010) vs Tau and Other Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf
tau -0.0240 0.00197
(0.0176) (0.0233)
tau (manuf) -0.0471∗∗ 0.0623∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0256)
Besley-Burgess -0.00525 0.00979
measure (regs) (0.00731) (0.0142)
Dougherty measure 0.0226 -0.0143
(all reforms) (0.0130) (0.0159)
log of net state 0.00312 0.0189 0.0107 0.0192 0.00413 0.0140 0.0212 0.0136
domestic product pc (0.0178) (0.0214) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.00863) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0195)
share of employment -0.393 0.00558 -0.708∗∗ 0.435 0.0194 -0.559 -0.515∗ 0.0525
in manufacturing (0.258) (0.329) (0.258) (0.325) (0.186) (0.362) (0.245) (0.323)
Constant 0.0969 -0.182 0.0372 -0.229 0.0209 -0.0675 -0.0861 -0.131
(0.173) (0.209) (0.139) (0.152) (0.0825) (0.160) (0.147) (0.182)
Observations 18 17 18 17 15 15 18 17
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses, Only including Major Indian States
from Aghion et al. (2008) should be largely the same in 2005 due to the lack of state level reforms between
1997 and 2005.
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Table 2.9: Manufacturing Productivity Growth (2005 - 2010) vs Tau and Other Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf reg manuf unreg manuf
tau -0.0321∗∗ 0.00522
(0.0146) (0.0239)
tau (manuf) -0.0512∗∗ -0.0567∗
(0.0181) (0.0275)
Besley-Burgess -0.00266 -0.00372
measure (regs) (0.0122) (0.0154)
Dougherty measure 0.0167 0.00973
(all reforms) (0.0122) (0.0166)
log of net state -0.0160 -0.00902 -0.00478 -0.0120 -0.00455 -0.00723 0.00438 -0.00793
domestic product pc (0.0148) (0.0220) (0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0143) (0.0182) (0.0145) (0.0204)
share of employment 0.206 0.0392 -0.154 -0.349 0.453 0.526 0.0728 0.0104
in manufacturing (0.214) (0.338) (0.215) (0.350) (0.310) (0.392) (0.230) (0.338)
Constant 0.141 0.124 0.0454 0.198 -0.0208 0.0530 -0.0678 0.119
(0.144) (0.214) (0.116) (0.163) (0.137) (0.174) (0.138) (0.190)
Observations 18 17 18 17 15 15 18 17
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01, Standard errors in parentheses, Only including Major Indian States
2.6.4 Inter-temporal Variation: A Final Puzzle
As we have noted, all of the analysis above uses data only from the 2005 Economic Census.
However, the discontinuity observed in the 2005 data does not appear in the 1990 or 1998
ECs. Explaining the puzzling inter-temporal variation is a main goal of our future work.
Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the data quality of the EC improved between 1998
and 2005. Indeed, it is intuitive that the presence of a downshift will be harder to dis-
cern upon the introduction of measurement error. This explanation has received anecdotal
support from our meetings with the Directors of the state Directorates of Economics and
Statistics, who largely claimed to be more confident in the results of the 2005 EC than in
the results of previous rounds. One reason for this could be that the 2005 EC was the first
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Figure 2.7: Variation in the distribution of establishment size across time:
wave in which ICR (“intelligent character recognition”) was used to read in the raw data.
This technology should have gone a long way in alleviating the considerable amount of error
that comes from manual interpretation and typing.
But one might also be concerned in the other direction: that somehow the distortion
observed in 2005 is anomalous and is perhaps due to something like a change in the EC’s
enumeration practices. Based on our interviews with officials and enumerators in charge
of collecting these data, however, we believe this is unlikely. While we have discovered
that enumeration practices have changed slightly over the years, we have not discovered
changes that could have produced the specific patterns we observe. For example, unlike the
previous waves, the 2005 Economic Census included an “address slip” that was meant to be
filled out for establishments with 10 or more workers. It is conceivable that enumerators,
in an effort to avoid the extra work of filling out the address slip, preferred to misrepresent
the number of workers for establishments with more than 10 workers. However, while this
could reasonably explain why there are fewer 10, 11 and 12 person establishments, we find
it hard to understand how this kind of phenomenon could explain why there are also fewer
30, 40 and 50 person establishments (see section 2.4.3 for more on this). Furthermore,
in post-enumeration checks done in West Bengal, Bihar and Tamil Nadu, this kind of
misrepresentation was not found to be in occurrence.
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Nor does the culprit seem to be changes in the regulations themselves. Indeed, none of
the regulations which we assume are responsible for the discontinuity in 2005 were greatly
changed in the right direction between 1990 and 2005. There were reforms on the margin
(reflected in the Dougherty (2009) measures), and these do seem to be correlated with our
measures of τ , but most of the changes have gone in the direction of loosening regulations
and thus cannot explain why τ would have increased over time. Enforcement has also
changed to some degree, but we have not yet found evidence that it can explain the variation
in our data (see the interstate analysis above).
Another possible (but ultimately unlikely) explanation is that changes in the competitive
environment, particularly related to the increased exposure to international markets and
competition, are responsible. The period in question (1998 to 2005) saw heavy reductions
in protective barriers from foreign competition - particularly through the elimination of
non-tariff barriers. However, in our preliminary analysis (not yet reported) we do not find a
strong link between trade liberalization and τ , and such link as exists goes in the opposite
direction.
A final possibility is that changes in the availability of contract labor cause the discon-
tinuity to show up in 2005. Indeed, there was a large speed-up in the use of contract labor
over the period,45 however state-level changes in the fraction of contract labor in registered
manufacturing are not robustly correlated with τ . The absence of such a correlation is not
necessarily evidence that such a link does not exist, but it does not give support to the
hypothesis either.
We have been able to share this intertemporal paradox with a number of experts re-
garding these issues in India but have not yet been able to find a watertight explanation.
This continues to be a priority in our ongoing work.
45In the registered manufacturing sector, the share of contract labor in total labor increased from 15% to
26%. Prior to this period, its growth was markedly slower.
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2.7 Conclusion
Our goals in this paper are 1) to document the effect of size-based labor regulations on the
misallocation of resources across firms via the employment decisions of business enterprises,
2) to estimate the net costs of the set of regulations that become binding when establish-
ments choose to employ 10 or more workers, and 3) to shed some light on the source of these
costs by demonstrating that corruption in the form of harassment bribery may play a large
role in making Indian regulations costly. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the
first to provide cost estimates of regulations in India (particularly non-IDA regulations), the
first to analyze the effects of regulations without using necessarily subjective evaluations of
state-level amendments to labor laws, and the first to provide evidence for the link between
regulatory costs and corruption.
To accomplish these tasks, we use the 2005 Economic Census of India, an uncommonly
used dataset which is uniquely suited to our task because it includes the entire universe
of non-farm enterprises. In our investigation, we find a significant level shift down in the
natural log of the probability mass of establishments with 10 or more workers. Adapting
a method from Garicano et al. (2013), we interpret this as evidence of substantial per-
worker costs of operating above the 10 worker threshold. At the all-India level, we find
that operating at or above the 10-worker threshold is associated with a 35% increase in the
unit cost of labor as modeled. Furthermore, we observe a great deal of variation in our
estimated costs by state, industry and ownership type. We estimate the highest (lowest)
costs for privately owned firms (government-owned firms) and firms in construction (public
administration and defense).
Exploring this variation reveals that Indian states with the highest costs also have the
highest levels of corruption and poor governance (as measured through two distinct indices),
and that firms in industries with high bureaucratic dependence are exposed to particularly
high costs if they are also in highly corrupt states. This analysis suggests that the size of
regulatory costs may have as much to do with how regulations are implemented and who
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implements them, as with the content of the specific labor and industrial laws themselves.
We hope that these findings will help shift the present debate away from arguments over the
pro or anti-labor stance of regulations and towards arguments about clarity, bureaucracy
and the proper enforcement of regulations.
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Appendix 1: Full Results by State and Industry46
Table 2.10: Estimates of Tau by State
State Tau Standard Error
Andhra Pradesh -.159 .038
Assam .322 .041
Bihar .693 .069
Delhi .427 .048
Gujarat .165 .047
Himachal Pradesh -.165 .023
Haryana .007 .044
Jharkhand .388 .061
Karnataka .52 .06
Kerala .138 .033
Maharashtra .332 .038
Madhya Pradesh .379 .047
Orissa .283 .044
Punjab .096 .041
Rajasthan .32 .05
Tamil Nadu .397 .059
Uttar Pradesh .502 .069
West Bengal .151 .054
46Standard errors generated using a wild cluster bootsrap procedure with 200 replications.
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Table 2.11: Estimates of Tau by Industry
Industry Tau Standard Error
Mining and quarrying -.042 .047
Manufacturing .268 .039
Electricity, gas and water supply -.367 .022
Construction .478 .047
Wholesale and retail trade .637 .115
Hotels and restaurants .468 .06
Transport, storage and communications .334 .056
Financial intermediation -.105 .044
Real estate, renting and business activities .601 .062
Public administration and defence -.311 .031
Education -.173 .042
Health and social work .076 .03
Other service activities .264 .057
Extraterritorial organizations and bodies .024 1.315
101
Table 2.12: Estimates of Tau by Owernship Type
Ownership Type Tau Standard Error
Government and public sector undertaking -.092 .028
Non profit institution -.04 .038
Unincorporated proprietary .43 .087
Unincorporated partnership -.058 .028
Corporate non financial -.197 .026
Corporate financial -.18 .023
Co-operative -.007 .022
Appendix 2: Anecdotal Evidence Regarding Harassment Bribery from
“ipaidabribe.com”
“I am a small factory owner in Kirti Nagar Industrial Area. We follow almost all rules
laid down by government for the welfare of workers. Now, even if we follow everything
there is always somethings where we lack and which needs improvement. We have a factory
inspector by the name of Mr.R.B.Singh (M: 9818829355). He comes to all the factories in
our area, inspects them, find mistakes and then harass and blackmails us. According to him
he can get our factories sealed. To avoid this, to save our time and to save the unnecessary
paperwork we pay him every year. I have paid him twice in two years i.e. 10000 & 15000
and this is common with all factories. Please take a strict action against him so that he
learns a lesson. I am sure he is not alone. All his colleagues are equally corrupt.”
(Reported on August 11, 2014 from New Delhi, Delhi — Report #131791)
“During the routine labor verification process by the labor department at our office, we
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were advised by the consultant to pay the labor inspector a bribe to ensure that they don’t
keep calling us for needless paperwork.”
(Reported on June 28, 2011 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu — Report #35064)
“The Labour Department requires a dozen odd registers to be maintained some of them
which are totally outdated and pointless. E.g: Salary register, Attendance register, Leave
register etc.
Our IT office has an electronic system that logs all entries/exits and leave taken. We
have the records and offerred to provide it to them in a printout.
Salaries are paid electronically via bank transfer.
The officer declined and said it must be maintained in a manual register!
Finally an arrangement was made where we maintain a few records manually and the
rest he would overlook.
Cost of arrangement Rs 1500 twice a year even if the officer shows up only once a year
for the inspection!
He is supposed to inspect twice so expects to be paid even for the time he did not show
up!” (Reported on October 13, 2010 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu — Report #44950)
“Well i had gone to renew my labour license and after all the running around in the bank
and the department, the signing authority asked me to pay Rs.500 for signing. When asked
why 500, i was told since there are 5 employess for Rs.100 each.” (Reported on December
31, 2010 from Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh — Report #43509 )
“... in my third visit i met one of office peon in Labour office he guided me for the
bribe he also investigated and advised me for bribe according to the number of Employees
deployed on contract basis and for this valueble suggestion he charged me Rs. 100. Again
with full confidence i went to the ALCs desk and straight away i offered him the packet
which was contains the amount of Bribe Rs. 3000/- ... He issued me the license after office
hours...” (Reported on March 30, 2011 from Mumbai, Maharashtra — Report #39133)
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“Applying for shop & establishment [registration] & procured all documents relating
to the registration. Finally inspectors are asking Rs.1000 as a bribe. If any other notice
received by the company for resolving that another Rs.2000 and above , it depends on the
company” (Reported on March 28, 2014 from Bangalore, Karnataka — Report #99016)
“Officer name Naveen Kumar . Mobile no. 9468104694- He is asking for a bribe of
60,000 and is saying will issue a negative report under labour laws.” (Reported on January
24, 2014 from Gurgaon, Haryana — Report #83365)
Appendix 3: Modeling Extortion (ie: Harassment Bribery)
In this Appendix we model size-based regulations in an environment where corrupt inspec-
tors use the fact that de jure regulations are numerous, complex and burdensome in order
to extort bribes from firms (ie: harassment bribery). The model aims to illustrate how cor-
ruption may lead to higher per worker costs for firms that exceed the 10 worker threshold,
while being as parsimonious as possible. The set-up and timeline is described below and in
Figure 2.8.
First, firms must choose their number of workers (n ≥ 10 or n′ < 10).47 As in Section
2.4.1, firms are characterized by a productivity parameter α, so that firms with higher
productivity would like to choose higher n. If firms choose n greater than or equal to 10,
they come under the legal purview of size-based regulations, which makes it more difficult
for them to appeal extortionary practices on the part of inspectors. After choosing a level
of employment, firms are randomly matched with an inspector. With probability κ, the
inspector is corrupt; otherwise the inspector is honest. An honest inspector will enforce
a reasonable interpretation of the spirit of the regulations if the firm has more than 10
workers. To be compliant with this “reasonable” interpretation of the regulations will cost
47Throughout, primes will denote the values of variables on the side of the decision tree in which firms
hire less than 10 workers.
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the firm an amount F1(n), which may in general depend on the number of workers in the
firm. A firm with fewer than 10 workers incurs no regulatory costs if matched with an
honest inspector.
If the firm is instead matched with a corrupt inspector, the inspector will threaten
to report the firm for technical infractions unless it pays a bribe (which we denote b or
b′, depending on whether the firm has chosen n ≥ 10 or n′ < 10), the value of which
is determined by Nash Bargaining. The firm may choose to pay the bribe or appeal the
threatened fine in court. If appealing the fine in court, the firm will win with probability
p (or p′) but will incur legal fees (cL) with certainty. If it wins the case, the firm has no
further financial obligations. If the firm loses, it is obliged to pay an amount F2(n), which
we take to be much larger than F1(n). This last assumption is tantamount to supposing
that a reasonable level of compliance with regulations is not extremely costly in comparison
to the punishments that could be brought by an inspector for violating the regulations -
which may be a reasonable assumption in contexts where inspectors have a great amount
of bargaining power and/or punishments can involve prison sentences. The assumption is
also necessary for the framework to be one of extortion rather than collusion: if F1(n) were
large in comparison with F2(n), firms would benefit from collusion and would face lower
costs with corrupt inspectors than with honest ones. It is also plausible that both F2(n) and
F1(n) are increasing functions of the number of workers, especially if we acknowledge that
the full cost of any fine would include the opportunity cost of a manager’s time. We will
consider the case where the total fines are directly proportional to the number of workers:
Fi(n) = fi ∗n. The decision tree representing the firm’s choices described above is provided
in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Decision Tree
Firm
n’ ¡ 10
Nature
honest inspector
pi(α, n′)
0
corrupt (prob κ)
Firm
pay
pi(α, n′)− b′
b′
appeal
Nature
win with prob p′
pi(α, n′)− cL
0
lose
pi(α, n′)− cL − F2(n′)
0
n ≥ 10
Nature
honest inspector
pi(α, n)− F1(n)
0
corrupt (prob κ)
Firm
pay
pi(α, n)− b
b
appeal
Nature
win with prob p
pi(α, n)− cL
0
lose
pi(α, n)− cL − F2(n)
0
An important assumption is that p′, the probability of a firm’s winning the case when
n′ < 10, is much higher than p, the probability of winning the case when n ≥ 10. The idea
is that a firm with less than 10 workers is not under the legal purview of the regulations, so
any case regarding regulatory infractions brought against the firm would have no standing
in court. In what follows, we will take p = 0 and p′ = 1 for simplicity. As previously
mentioned, if the firm meets a corrupt inspector, the value of the bribe paid to avoid going
to court is determined through a process of Nash Bargaining over the surplus, where α and
β are the bargaining weights of the inspector and firm, respectively:
max
b
(b)α(cL + (1− p)F2(n)− b)β
The solution of this maximization problem is that b = α(cL+(1−p)F2(n))α+β (and b
′ =
α(cL+(1−p′)F2(n))
α+β , for firms with less than 10 workers). Given that firms meet corrupt in-
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spectors (and thus pay bribes) with probability κ and meet honest inspectors (and thus pay
F1(n)) with probability 1− κ, the expected cost for a firm with greater than 10 workers is
κb+(1−κ)F1(n), while the expected cost for a firm with less than 10 workers is κb′. Taking
the difference and substituting in our expressions for b and b′, we get that firms that cross the
10 worker threshold face an increase in expected costs of κ αα+β (p
′− p)F2(n) + (1−κ)F1(n).
We are interested, however, in the increase in per worker costs that firms face when
exceeding the 10 worker threshold, not the increase in total costs (as discussed earlier, an
increase in per worker costs is the only way to produce a downshift in the logged firm size
distribution in a static model). Thus, we divide the last result by the number of workers,
n, to get per worker costs. Before doing so, we make the further simplifications that p = 0,
p′ = 1, α and β both equal 1 (equal bargaining weights), and that all fines are proportional
to firm size (Fi(n) = fi ∗ n). Then, the increase in per worker costs for firms that exceed
the 10 worker threshold is κf22 + (1− κ)f1.
From the last result we see that if f2  f1 (in particular, in this case, if f2 > 2f1), then
the increase in a firm’s per worker costs for exceeding the 10 worker threshold (i.e.: what we
call τ in the paper) is increasing in the proportion of corrupt inspectors, κ. Again, that we
are considering a context of extortion or “harassment bribery” is implied by the assumption
f2  f1. It is this condition (that f2 is very large) that gives corrupt inspectors the power to
extract heavy bribes. We think it is a reasonable assumption given the anecdotal evidence
regarding bribery we have found (some of which we present in Appendix 2). To conclude, the
model above illustrates conditions that may explain the correlations we observed between
corruption and τ in Section 2.6. In particular, the conclusion of the model is that firms in
states with a higher proportion of corrupt inspectors (ie: more corrupt states), face higher
per worker costs for exceeding the 10 worker threshold (higher τ).
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Chapter 3
Distributional Impacts of Dismantling the Small-Scale Reservation Policy
in India
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of dismantling a prominent industrial regulation in India:
the Small Scale Reservation Laws (SSRL). The SSRL mandated that certain goods be
exclusively produced by firms maintaining less than a specified level of investment in plant
and machinery. The original rationale for the SSRL was to make Indian industry to be more
labor intensive by constraining the use of capital, in the hopes that it would then provide
more employment to unskilled labor leaving the agricultural sector. At the height of the
reservation policy, approximately 1000 goods were reserved, making up nearly 25 percent
of total manufacturing output (Tewari and Wilde (2014)).
Criticism of the SSRL eventually grew, particularly after the liberalization reforms of
1991, since the laws were argued to make Indian industry less efficient and therefore less
competitive with foreign producers who could now enter the Indian market. Starting in
1997, the SSRL policy was gradually dismantled, a process we refer to as “dereservation.”
Each year, a number of goods were removed from the list of reserved products so that
firms producing them were free to exceed the capital thresholds. By 2008, only 20 products
remained reserved - although, of the ever-reserved products, these never dereserved products
account for a disproportionately large number of firms.
We examine the effect of dereservation of particular goods between 2001 and 2006 on the
characteristics of the cross-section of firms producing the dereserved goods. We investigate
the effect of the 2001 to 2006 dereservation because in 2006 the threshold was increased from
Rs. 10,000,000 (roughly $200,000) to Rs. 50,000,000 (about $1 million). Dereservation was
thus a different phenomenon from 2006 onwards since the capital constraint had become
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much less binding and we would expect expansion even by still-reserved goods producers.
Comparing the evolution of distributions of producer characteristics for dereserved goods to
never-reserved goods using the Changes-in-Changes model of Athey and Imbens (2006), we
find that dereservation led to a substantial increase in the value of capital employed among
producers of previously-reserved goods. We find that producers hired more employees as
their scale of production increased, but less than in proportion to capital. We show sug-
gestive evidence that the increase in the value of capital employed comes from an increase
in capital intensity among establishments that had been producing dereserved goods when
they were still reserved.
The magnitude of the reservation and dereservation policies have prompted substantial
interest from the academic community. From a macroeconomic perspective, there has been
particular interest in investigating the role reservation may have played in misallocation
across firms as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013) perform
industry-level regression analysis and find that the fraction of output dereserved does not
correlate with reallocation to more productive firms. Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014)
theoretically examine the problem of occupational choice in a dual sector economy, with
quantitative results calibrated to match the Indian reservation context. In their model,
removing reservation policy can generate substantial gains in TFP. In this paper, we provide
more rigorous microeconometric evidence on the effects of the policy, with the intention of
building a bridge to more theory-based work.
Since beginning work on the paper, we have learned about two other working papers that
investigate the process of dereservation within a difference-in-differences program evaluation
framework. Tewari and Wilde (2014) look at the effect of dereservation at the industry
level and find increases in productivity. In the closest paper to ours, Martin, Nataraj,
and Harrison (2014) primarily investigate the within-plant effect of producing a dereserved
good on various plant-level outcomes, finding small or negative effects on outcomes for
firms already producing a dereserved good at the time of dereservation (i.e.: incumbents)
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and positive effects on outcomes for firms that only begin production of the good after
dereservation (i.e.: entrants). However, even with respect to Martin et al. (2014), our paper
differs in methodology, objectives, and findings.
While Tewari and Wilde (2014) and Martin et al. (2014) operate within a linear, para-
metric framework, we provide the first non-parametric evidence of effects of the policy.
Non-parametric evidence is particularly important to establish a credible impact of the
deregulation given reasons to be concerned about the extent to which the capital enforce-
ment was binding, due to poor enforcement or plants’ achieving efficient scale below the
threshold (see the discussion around figure 3.2). In fact, doubts about the extent to which
the regulation was binding were a feature of policy discussions at the time of dereservation
(National Productivity Council (2009)). Further, we show in Appendix 3.9 that linear,
parametric estimates are highly sensitive to the estimation sample used, particularly with
respect to the units considered for comparison with the dereserved plants. In contrast,
our non-parametric estimates for the average effect of dereservation on capital and labor
are robust to alternative choices of comparison groups. We also focus on the effects of
dereservation alone while Tewari and Wilde (2014) and Martin et al. (2014)’s estimated
effects combine the effect of dereservation and the 2006 increase in the capital threshold for
still-reserved producers1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief explanation
of the institutional background, Section 3.3 describes the data used in our analysis, section
3.4 a descriptive analysis of reservation and dereservation, section 3.5 the empirical specifi-
cations employed to test for the effect of dereservation and section 3.6 the results. Section
3.7 provides an analysis of the effect of dereservation on plant exit. Finally, section 3.8
concludes.
1Martin et al. (2014) do look at longer-run effects, but using district-level variation in the fraction of
reserved products in 2000, so their two sets of results are not directly comparable.
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3.2 Institutional Background: Small Scale Reservation in India
The definition of the Small Scale Industry (SSI) Sector has undergone several changes over
time. The definition was first set out in the Industries (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1951, to include establishments that do not exceed a prescribed threshold “defined
in terms of investment limits in plant and machinery”. This threshold was revised on a
number of occasions - usually upward, with the goal of keeping up with inflation, although
the changes do not track inflation precisely. The nomenclature has also changed, so that
what were previously known as “Small Scale Industries” are now referred to in government
documents as “Small and Micro Enterprises”. The relevant changes in the SSI definition
over the recent period are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Historical definition of Small Scale Industry Sector
Period: 1997-1999 1999-2006 2006-present
Capital Limit
30 10 50
(Millions of
Rs.):
Nomenclature: “Small Scale Industry” “Small Scale Industry” “Small Enterprise”
Although the SSI sector was the focus of a large array of policies (including preferred
access to government contracts and finance), product reservation was probably the most
controversial of all SSI policies. The policy required all firms producing certain items to be
classified as SSI enterprises (or as “Small Enterprises”, in more recent nomenclature) - and
thus to maintain a level of investment in plant and machinery less than the thresholds given
in Table 3.1. If an enterprise was already above the capital threshold when a good it was
producing was placed on the reservation list, it could be grandfathered in and allowed to
remain in production - although its capital and production levels would be capped at their
current levels. Another exception to the rule was provided for enterprises that exported
50% or more of their production (National Productivity Council (2009), p 23).
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The policy of reservation began in 1967, when 47 items were placed on the SSI reservation
list. By 1978, this list had grown to 807 items (National Productivity Council (2009), p. 23).
The exact rationale behind how and when certain items were placed on the reserved list is not
entirely clear, although government reports argue that “[t]he overwhelming consideration
for Reservation of an item was its suitability and feasibility for being made in the small
scale sector without compromising quality aspects” (National Productivity Council (2009)).
The process by which certain goods were dereserved is similarly unclear, although it seems
the decisions were taken in consultation with certain members of industry. Furthermore,
we read that:
“The Advisory Committee makes its recommendations for reservation/de- reservation
in light of the factors like economies of scale; level of employment; possibility of encouraging
and diffusing entrepreneurship in industry; prevention of concentration of economic power
and any other factor which the Committee may think appropriate.” (Ministry of Micro,
Small and Medium Enterprises (2013), p.40)
Therefore, the process of dereservation may not have been entirely independent of an-
ticipated future product characteristics, although the precise rationale behind the decision
to dereserve certain items rather than others at certain points in time is certainly hard to
discern (Tewari and Wilde (2014)).
3.3 Data
Our main source of data on factory level outcomes is the Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI). The ASI covers the organized manufacturing sector in India, where organized refers
to manufacturing establishments registered with the state Directorate of Factories.2 The
ASI is representative at the state level, with establishments employing less than 100 workers
sampled from the listing maintained by the state Directorates of Factories and a complete
2According to the Factories Act (1947), a factory is required to be registered with Directorate (and be
thus classified as “organized”) if it has at least 10 workers and uses power (or if has at least 20 workers and
does not use power).
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enumeration of establishments employing more than 100 workers. We make use of the 2001-
2008 waves of the ASI. The year of a wave refers to the “fiscal year” (so that 2001 refers
to the fiscal year from April 1st, 2000 to March 31st, 2001). Establishments present in
repeated waves of the survey can be tracked through a unique identifier. Establishments in
the ASI may list several goods produced, each identified by ASICC code3.
The ASI is made up of two distinct data sets. The first, called the census sector, includes
plants employing 100 or more workers. These plants are surveyed every year. The second,
referred to as the sample sector, includes all other plants, with each plant having a 20%
probability of being sampled in a given survey year.
We constructed a mapping between the 1987 National Industrial Classification (NIC)
codes used by the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME)4 to identify
reserved products in official documents and the Annual Survey of Industries Commodity
Classification (ASICC) codes used to identify products in the Indian establishment-level
surveys used in the analysis and described below. We make our mapping from 1987 NIC
codes to ASICC codes because the official concordance from 1987 NIC codes to 1998 NIC
codes (which can be mapped through an official concordance to 2004 NIC codes) is from 3-
digit 1987 NIC code to 4-digit 1998 NIC codes. The MSME Ministry identifies products by
their 8-digit 1987 NIC code, so the official concordance is too coarse a mapping. Our basic
procedure, similar to the approach described in Martin et al. (2014), is then to manually
map 8-digit 1987 NIC codes to 5-digit 2004 NIC codes. We use an official concordance
between 2004 NIC codes and ASICC codes to pick out the appropriate ASICC codes. The
final mapping identifies the ASICC code for all products reserved in 1997, when the number
of reserved products was greatest.
3We have ASI data beginning with the 1999 wave, but like Martin et al. (2014), we discard the 1999 and
2001 waves due to very poor data about products produced by factories.
4Prior to 2001, the MSME ministry was known as the Ministry of Small Scale Industries.
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3.4 Descriptive analysis
In this section, we investigate the distribution of plants by a measure of their capital stock
(specifically, investment in plant and machinery) for several different reservation statuses.
In 2001 we compare the distributions of capital stock by plants in two categories:
• “never reserved” - producing an item that has never been on the reservation list. This
is the control group in the pre-treatment period5.
• “reserved” - producing an item on the reservation list in 2001 that will be dereserved
between 2001 and 2006. Firms in the reserved category are subject to the SSI con-
straints in 2001. This is the treatment group, before receiving treatment.
In arguing for the use of “never reserved” as a valid proxy for the changes occurring over
time in the outcomes we will investigate, we point out that the distribution of factor cost
ratios was quite similar across the two groups of producers in 2001 as shown in figure 3.1.
Our results in this and subsequent sections are robust to restricting our analysis to produc-
ers of certain product categories6 with fractions of producers of goods to be dereserved lying
in specified intervals. Setting a minimum fraction of goods to be dereserved makes it more
likely that treatment and control group producers experience the same demand and supply
shocks. This must be balanced against product classes where the fraction of producers to be
dereserved is sufficiently large that we are concerned that dereservation would have effects
on never-reserved goods producers, for example by bidding up the price of inputs. There-
fore, we have experimented with providing minimum and maximum fractions of dereserved
goods producers, with qualitatively similar results7. Appendix 3.10 shows the fractions of
producers in each product category in 2001.
5We can also use “already dereserved” firms as the control group. That is, firms producing goods that
were dereserved prior to 2001. The results in section 3.6 are quite similar with this alternative control group.
6We use 2- and 3-digit ASICC codes to delineate product categories.
7Specifically, we have tried excluding producers of goods with less than 5 and 10% of producers man-
ufacturing dereserved goods and well as excluding producers of goods with less than 5% and more than
20%.
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Figure 3.1: 2001 density of log(factor cost ratio)
Figure 3.2 shows kernel density plots of the distributions of the natural log of the nominal
value of capital for these two categories. Surprisingly, the plants producing never-reserved
goods are slightly smaller than those producing reserved goods. The vertical line shows the
threshold level of capital stock in this and the subsequent figures. It is notable that both
distributions are relatively smooth, particularly around the threshold. Given that firms
were expected to follow different rules if operating above the threshold, one might expect
some change in the shape of the distributions around the threshold. The smoothness of the
distributions around the threshold and the substantial mass of plants operating above the
threshold may lead observers to question whether the regulations were actually binding.
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Figure 3.2: 2001 density of log(capital)
In 2006, we look at two categories:
• “never reserved” - the control group, in the post-treatment period.
• “dereserved” - producing an item that was previously on the reservation list in 2001
but has since been removed and are thus no longer subject to the SSI constraints.
This is the treatment group, after receiving treatment.
Figure 3.3 shows kernel density plots of the distributions of log capital for these two cate-
gories. In contrast to figure 3.2, the distribution of capital for dereserved firms shows a bulge
to the right of the capital threshold, which we will identify as the effect of dereservation after
accounting for the effect of time as captured by the shift of the never-reserved distribution
from 2001 to 2006. Figure 3.3 is notable for two reasons. First, the figure provides the
first non-parametric evidence of an effect of the dereservation. It is difficult to explain the
distortion observed in the distribution occurring right at the regulatory threshold for other
reasons and the size of the distortion grows over time from 2005, when a fraction of products
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was already dereserved, to 2008. Second, the disproportionate expansion of a portion of
the distribution of reserved firms suggests that only some producers took advantage of the
dereservation. Whether this is due to selection or information frictions is left as a question
for future work.
Figure 3.3: 2006 density of log(capital)
Figure 3.4 emphasizes this point further, separating the dereserved plants into two
categories:
• “incumbents” who produced a dereserved product before it was dereserved.
• “entrants” who only produce a dereserved product after it is dereserved.
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Figure 3.4: 2006 density of log(capital) - incumbents and entrants
We see that the bulge in the dereserved distribution in figure 3.3 is a result of the distribution
of capital for incumbent firms.
Figures 3.5 - 3.7 show local linear regressions of the (capital/labor) factor cost ratio for
the treatment group (reserved good producers in 2001, dereserved good producers in 2006),
split in figures 3.6 and 3.7 by incumbent and entrant status. Figure 3.6 suggests that the
expansion in the value of capital stock among incumbents just above the threshold was not
accompanied by a concomitant increase in the wage bill. In contrast, the 2006 entrants
shown in figure 3.7 display an expansion path of factor cost ratios more similar to that of
reserved goods producers in 2001.
118
Figure 3.5: 2001, factor cost ratio (capital/labor) by log(capital) for producers of goods to
be dereserved
Figure 3.6: 2006, factor cost ratio (capital/labor) by log(capital) for dereserved products -
incumbents
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Figure 3.7: 2006, factor cost ratio (capital/labor) by log(capital) for dereserved products -
entrants
3.5 Empirical specification
We will look at the effect of dereservation on the distribution of the regulated firm attribute,
capital stock. To this end, we use the Changes-in-Changes (CIC) model of Athey and Imbens
(2006) (AI) to estimate the effect of dereservation on the distribution of capital stock. To
capture the effect of time (from 2001 to 2006) on the distribution of capital stock, we use
the evolution of the distribution of capital for never-reserved goods producers.
In our context, the AI approach is based on the assumption that, in the absence of
dereservation, an establishment’s capital stock is generated by the following function.
Yt = ht(U)
ht(·) is strictly increasing in U , a producer-specific unobserved attribute. In the absence of
dereservation, we must further assume that the distribution of U for producers of both sets
of goods (dereserved from 2001 to 2006 and never-reserved) is unaffected by time. These two
assumptions allow us to recover the distribution of Yt under reservation for dereserved goods
producers in period t′ as FYt|G=d
(
F
(−1)
Yt|G=n
(
FYt′ |G=n (yt′ |G = n) |G = d
))
where G = {n, d}
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is a random variable indexing producers of never-reserved and reserved/dereserved goods,
respectively. We use this expression to compute the counterfactual distribution of producer
attributes under product reservation in 2006 for dereserved products.
3.6 Results
Table 3.2 and figure 3.8 show the result of applying the distributional analysis described in
the previous section. The observed distributions in figure 3.8 are as in figures 3.2 and 3.3:
we see again that reserved firms are larger than never-reserved firms in 2001 (bold lines)
and 2006 (fine lines). Dereserved (to be dereserved in 2001) establishments’ distributions of
capital stock are shown with solid lines, never-reserved with dashed lines. The solid line with
asterisk markers represents the counterfactual outcome for producers of dereserved goods,
had the goods not been dereserved. The counterfactual is computed by assuming that the
distribution of capital for reserved products would have undergone the same transformation
from 2001 to 2006 as the distribution for never reserved products. The average effect of
dereservation is estimated at 0.2308 and is significant at the 10% level.
Table 3.2: CIC results: dereserved vs. never reserved
log(real capital) log(employment) log(output) log(real wage)
0.2308 0.0806 0.0569 -0.0390
(0.1202) (0.0746) (0.1105) (0.0298)
Note: standard errors in parentheses, based on 100 replications of the bootstrap procedure
described in Athey and Imbens (2006).
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of value of log(real capital stock), 2001 (before) and 2006 (after)
dereserved and never reserved
We note that the effect on log(capital) is twice as large as the largest effect on capital
reported in Martin et al. (2014), a fact we attribute to their effect being on capital in
any year following dereservation. If the effect of dereservation on capital is increasing over
time, as we show is the case in the following subsection, their effect may place more weight
on smaller short-run impacts while our estimates place more weight on the medium-run
impacts of the policy.
The results for other outcomes are smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant.
There is weak evidence that plants expanded their use of labor along with capital, which
would allay policymaker’s fears of a decrease in employment following a reallocation of
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resources from smaller, more labor-intensive plants to larger, more capital-intensive plants.
Given the shape of the effect on the distribution of capital, we conjecture that it may be
possible to gain power to investigate the effect of the deregulation on other outcomes with
this comparison group by looking at effects on plants operating just above and below the
capital threshold.
3.6.1 Medium- and long-term effects comparing with “already dereserved”
producers
Using “already dereserved” producers (producers of goods dereserved before 2001) as an
alternative control group, table 3.3 shows that we arrive at an almost identical average
effect on log(capital) by 2006. The average effect using this control group is less precisely-
estimated, however. There are fewer “already dereserved” goods producers, making estima-
tion of distributions of their characteristics less precise. Effects on employment are again
similar, but effects on output with this comparison group are much larger.
Table 3.3: CIC results: 2006 impacts - dereserved 2001-2006 vs. dereserved before 2001
log(real capital) log(employment) log(output)
0.2259 0.1228 0.3733
(0.1555) (0.0865) (0.1264)
Note: standard errors in parentheses, based on 100 replications of the bootstrap procedure
described in Athey and Imbens (2006).
By 2008 (table 3.4), the impact of the 2001-2006 dereservation had become so large
that it is statistically significant for all three outcomes. The evolution of the difference
in the distribution of capital is shown in figures 3.9 - 3.11. The pattern of responses
between capital and labor is consistent across tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4: capital increases by
about twice as much as labor. This contrasts with the results from Martin et al. (2014),
where effects on capital and labor are similar in magnitude. The difference may be due to
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Martin et al. (2014)’s inclusion of the 2006-2008 dereservations, when estimating the effect
of dereservation is complicated by the large increase in the threshold value of capital in
2006. Including these dereservations could mute the effect of dereservation on capital by
comparing the evolution of dereserved goods producers with still-reserved goods producers
who are also increasing their capital usage.
Table 3.4: CIC results: 2008 impacts - dereserved 2001-2006 vs. dereserved before 2001
log(real capital) log(employment) log(output)
0.4954 0.2285 0.5906
(0.2187) (0.1000) (0.1307)
Note: standard errors in parentheses, based on 100 replications of the bootstrap procedure
described in Athey and Imbens (2006).
Figure 3.9: 2001 density of log(capital)
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Figure 3.10: 2006 density of log(capital)
Figure 3.11: 2008 density of log(capital)
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3.7 Analysis of Exit
Table 3.5 shows the total number of factories operating according to ASI estimates in 2001
and 2006. Exit rates, derived by taking the percentage change in the number of factories in
2006 after subtracting factories with opening dates after 2001, are given in the third column.
We see that there were differences in exit rates between producers of dereserved products
and already-dereserved products, but that exit rates were similar between dereserved and
never- and always-reserved products. In other words, dereservation does not seem to be
associated with higher or lower levels of exit in comparison with most of the groups that
did not experience dereservation over the period.
Table 3.5: Number of Factories Over The Period: 2001 and 2006
Total number in
2001
Total number in
2006
Total number in
2006 - excluding
new factories
(% change) (% change)
Always reserved 7379 7687 6482
(4.2) (-12.2)
Always dereserved 11138 13398 10535
(20.3) (-5.4)
Never reserved 90883 95064 77122
(4.6) (-15.1)
Dereserved during 2935 3226 2496
(treatment) (9.9) (-15.0)
3.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided non-parametric evidence of the impact of removing restrictions
on the value of capital stock for producers of specific goods in India over the period from
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2001 to 2006. We saw that the removal of restrictions led to a large expansion in the value
of the capital stock employed by producers of the newly-unrestricted goods and that the
effect grew substantially over time. In contrast to the previous literature, we find that the
expansion appears to have come mostly from firms who were already producing reserved
goods before dereservation. We find that employment rose due to an increase in the scale
of production, but much less so than capital, as firms producing dereserved goods became
more capital-intensive. The worst fear of policymakers, a fall in employment, thus did not
occur over the period of our study.
The period we study, from 2001 to 2008, was also a period of high growth, however. It
seems plausible that the increase in capital intensity we observe would be sustained during
in a period of slower growth and would lead to slower employment growth in the previously-
reserved sector than if reservation had been maintained. This is an important subject for
future research on the dereservation as more data become available.
3.9 Appendix: Linear Differences in Differences - the effect of varying
the estimation sample
All specifications consider two-period linear difference-in-difference specifications, with 2001
as the pre-treatment period and 2006 as the post-treatment period.
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Table 3.6: Capital vs Dereservation Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
dereserved 0.0949 0.0804 0.469∗ 0.0751
(0.0711) (0.0769) (0.269) (0.0613)
2006.year 0.105∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.137 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0375) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.34∗∗∗ 13.21∗∗∗ 13.16∗∗∗ 13.38∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0131) (0.0220) (0.00891)
N 59460 34702 26212 57242
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Capital vs Dereservation Status (interacted with readymade garments indicator)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
dereserved 0.0912 0.0776 0.732∗∗ 0.0562
(0.0844) (0.0886) (0.301) (0.0707)
readymade -0.215 -0.267 0.120 -0.226
(0.192) (0.200) (0.441) (0.192)
deresXreadymade 0.0299 0.0294 -0.393 0.0792
(0.149) (0.149) (0.252) (0.141)
2006.year 0.105∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.137 0.0919∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0375) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.35∗∗∗ 13.22∗∗∗ 13.14∗∗∗ 13.39∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0159) (0.0287) (0.00966)
N 59460 34702 26212 57242
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Capital vs Dereservation Status (including interaction with entrant/incumbent
status)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
deresXent 0.0469 0.0386 0 -0.199
(0.156) (0.157) (.) (0.147)
deresXinc 0.123∗ 0.107 0.469∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.0646) (0.0711) (0.269) (0.0645)
2006.year 0.105∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ -0.137 0.0922∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0375) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.35∗∗∗ 13.22∗∗∗ 13.22∗∗∗ 13.40∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0277) (0.00909) (0.0119)
N 59460 34702 26212 57242
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Capital vs Dereservation Status (including interaction with entrant/incumbent
status - excluding readymade garments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
deresXent 0.0407 0.0320 0 -0.241
(0.161) (0.161) (.) (0.157)
deresXinc 0.137∗ 0.121 0.728∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.0729) (0.0782) (0.301) (0.0728)
2006.year 0.105∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.137 0.0926∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0377) (0.235) (0.0172)
cons 13.34∗∗∗ 13.20∗∗∗ 13.19∗∗∗ 13.39∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0268) (0.00597) (0.0114)
N 58489 33746 25534 56271
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Capital vs Dereservation Status (including interaction with entrant/incumbent
status - including only readymade garments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm ln fix cap cl nm
deresXent 0.693 0.874∗∗ 0 0.693
(0.424) (0.411) (.) (0.424)
deresXinc 0.564 0.745∗∗ 0.206 0.564
(0.351) (0.336) (0.159) (0.351)
2006.year -0.366 -0.547∗ 0 -0.366
(0.330) (0.313) (.) (0.330)
cons 13.16∗∗∗ 13.15∗∗∗ 13.21∗∗∗ 13.16∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0323) (0.000429) (0.0330)
N 25904 25889 25611 25904
Standard errors in parentheses
Year and firm FEs included.
1st col includes all factories, 2nd excludes never reserved,
3rd excludes still reserved and 4th excludes previously dereserved
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.10 Appendix: Fractions of plants producing in each 2-digit ASICC
product class by category
Product category % of all plants
producing
goods in the
category in
the treatment
group
FRUITS, VEGETABLES, CEREALS & PULSES AND OTHER
VEGETABLE PRODUCES LIKE LAC, GUM ETC. AND PREPA-
RATION THEREOF
0.89
SALTS, SULPHER, PLASTERING MATERIALS, LIME & CE-
MENT
0.07
MINERAL FUELS: OILS, PRODUCTS & BY-PRODUCTS 14.15
INORGANIC CHEMICAL, COMPOUND OF PRECIOUS MATE-
RIALS ETC
19.83
ORGANIC CHEMICALS 9.68
DYEING, TANNING, COLOURING, INK & PAINT ETC 9.09
ESSENTIAL OIL, COSMETICS & PERFUMES, DENTAL MATE-
RIALS, WAX POLISHING/CLEANING MATERIALS
20.38
MISC CHEMICAL GOODS INCL ALBUMINOIDAL SUB-
STANCES MODIFIED STARCHES (EXCL SUB-DIVISION 124)
AND GLUES, ENZYMES
20.54
RUBBER AND MANUFACTURE OF RUBBER [THIS INCL SYN-
THETIC RUBBER]
16.57
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PLASTIC, PVC ARTICLES INCL PACKAGING PRODUCTS
AND FOOTWEAR PLASTIC OR PVC
7.37
ARTICLE OF LEATHER, SADLARY AND HARNESS, TRAVEL
GOODS, HAND BAGS AND SIMILAR PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL
GUT
70.08
MISC PRODUCTS/ARTICLES OF RUBBER/PVC/LEATHER
ETC
12.88
WOOD AND PULP OF WOOD AND PRODUCTS THEREOF
EXCL FORESTRY
1.16
PAPER AND PAPER BOARD 26.07
PACKING MATERIALS AND CONTAINERS OF PAPER 9.06
WOOL/ANIMAL HAIR, YARN & FABRICS 5.01
COTTON, COTTON YARN AND FABRICS 12.22
SYNTHETIC (MAN-MADE) AND MIXED TEXTILES 1.48
SPECIAL WOVEN FABRIC AND ARTICLES THEREOF 2.61
IRON & STEEL (INCL STAINLESS STEEL) & ARTICLES
THEREOF
4.5
COPPER, NICKEL & ZINC ARTICLES THEREOF 14.47
ALUMINIUM, TIN, LEAD & OTHER BASE METALS & ARTI-
CLES THEREOF
19.32
MISC. MANUFACTURE OF BASE METALS, N.E.C 7.79
NON-ELECTRICAL MACHINE TOOLS & GENERAL PURPOSE
MACHINERIES AND COMPONENTS AND PARTS THEREOF
1.01
NON-ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY SPECIFIC EQUIP-
MENT/MACHINERIES INCL PARTS THEREOF
6.14
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ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
INCL PARTS (EXCL MEDICAL & NON-CONVENTIONAL EN-
ERGY EQUIPMENT)
2.39
ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT & PARTS EXCL BIO-MEDICAL
EQUIPMENT
8.29
ROAD SURFACE VEHICLE EXCL RAILWAYS & PARTS N.E.C 0.21
OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, WATCH AND OTHER PRECI-
SION EQUIPMENT, MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS AND PARTS
THEREOF
20.46
MISC NON CLASSIFIED MANUFACTURED ARTICLES &
PARTS
0
Total 7.2
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3.11 Appendix: example of dereservation within a 3-digit ASICC prod-
uct class
Table 3.12: Product class (subdivision) 443 - Leather Footwear & Parts Thereof
code product name year of dereservation
44301 CHAPPALS/SANDALS, LEATHER 2003
44302 FOOT WEAR, BOOT never reserved
44303 FOOT WEAR, OTHERS, LEATHER 2001
44305 SHOE UPPER LEATHER SHEET never reserved
44306 SHOE UPPER, LEATHER 2003
44311 SHOE SOLE, LEATHER 1999
44312 MID SOLE SHEET, LEATHER never reserved
44313 INSOLE / OUTSOLE, LEATHER never reserved
44315 EYE LETS, LEATHER never reserved
44316 SHOE LINER, LEATHER never reserved
44389 FOOTWEAR, LEATHER & PARTS , N.E.C never reserved
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